Tag: Questioning

Metacognition and the Fish in the Water

by Steven J. Pearlman, Ph.D. The Critical Thinking Initiative

As the saying goes, you cannot ask a fish about water. Having had no other environmental experience as a counter reference, the fish cannot understand what water is because the fish has never experienced what water isn’t.

Cognition—broadly meaning that the mind is working—is to homo sapiens as water is to fish. So steeped are we in the water of our own cognitive processing that we cannot recognize it. Even though we all possess an extensive list of examples of other people failing to think well, we nevertheless lack an internal reference point for being devoid of thought; every consideration we might make of what it would be like to not-think can only happen through the process of thinking about it.

cartoon drawing of a goldfish on a blue background

This is the difference between metacognition, which is being intentionally self-aware of what we are doing when we are thinking, and critical thinking, which, loosely speaking, is the capacity to reason through problems and generate ideas. In one sense, we seem to do just fine thinking critically without that metacognitive awareness. We solve problems. We invent the future. We cure diseases. We build communities. But in another all-too-real sense, we struggle, for if we lack the metacognitive acumen to understand what critical thinking is, then we equally lack the capacity to improve our capability to do it and to monitor and evaluate our progress.

The Problem and the Need

Case in point, even though research shows that critical thinking is typically listed among necessary outcomes at educational institutions, “it is not supported and taught systematically in daily instructions” because “teachers are not educated in critical thinking” (Astleitner, 2002). Worse than that, one study of some 30 educators found that not a single one could provide “a clear idea of critical thinking” (Choy & Cheah, 2009). Thus, even though “one would be hard pressed to construct a serious counterargument to the claim that we would like to see students become careful, rigorous thinkers as an outcome of the education we provide them. … By most accounts, we remain far from achieving it” (Kuhn, 1999).

But we do need to achieve that rigorous thinking, because nothing is arguably more important than improving our overall capacity to think. To do so, we must seek to understand the relationship between critical thinking and metacognition, for though interrelated, they’re not the same. In fact, we can think critically without being metacognitive, but we cannot be metacognitive without thinking critically. And that might make metacognition the seminal force of true critical thinking development.

Some Classroom Examples

Consider, for example, asking a student, “What is your thinking about the assigned readings about the Black Lives Matter movement”? Were the student to respond with anything substantive, then we could loosely say the student exercised at least some critical thinking, such as some analysis of the sources and some evaluation of their usefulness. For example, were the student to state that “by referencing statistics on black arrests, source A made a more compelling argument than source B,” then we could rightly say that the student generated some critical thinking. But we cannot say that the student engaged in any metacognitive effort.

But what if the student responded, “Because of its use of statistics on black arrests, Source A changed my thinking about the Black Lives Matter because I was previously unaware of the disparities between white arrest rates and black arrest rates”? Is that metacognitive? Not truly. Even though the student was aware of a change in their own thoughts, they expressed no self-awareness of the internal thinking process that catalyzed that change. There is not necessarily a meaningful distinction between what that student did and someone who says that they had not liked mashed potatoes until they tried these mashed potatoes. They recognized a shift in thought, but not necessarily the underlying mechanism of that shift.

However, if the student responded as follows, we would begin to see metacognition on top of critical thinking: “I realized upon reading Source A that I held a tacit bias about the issue, one that was framed from my own experience being white. I had been working under the assumption that race didn’t matter, and it wasn’t until the article presented the statistics that my thinking was impacted enough for me to become aware of my biases and change my position.” In that sentence, we see the student metacognitively recognizing an aspect of their own thinking process, namely their personal biases and the relationship between those biases and new information. As Mahdvi (2014) said, “Metacognitive thoughts do not spring from a person’s immediate external reality; rather, their source is tied to the person’s own internal mental representations of that reality, which can include what one knows about that internal representation, how it works, and how one feels about it.” And that’s what this example demonstrates: the student’s self-awareness of “internal mental representations of … reality.”

The Value of Metacognition to Critical Thinking

When metacognition is present, all thinking acts are critical because they are by nature under reflection, and scrutiny. While one could interpret a love poem without being metacognitive, one could not be metacognitive about why they interpret a poem a certain way—such as in considering one’s biases about “love” from their personal history—without thinking critically. Since metacognition can only happen when we are monitoring our thinking about something, the metacognition inherently makes the thinking act critical.

Yet, even though metacognition infuses some measure of criticality to thinking, metacognition nevertheless isn’t synonymous with critical thinking. Metacognition alone does not successfully critique existing ideas, analyze the world, develop meaningful questions, produce new solutions, etc. So, we can think without being metacognitive, but if we want to improve our thinking—if we want to understand and enhance the machinations of our mind—then we must seek and attain the metacognitive skills that reveal what our mind is doing and why it is doing it.

Accomplishing that goal requires an introspective humility. It means embracing the premise that our own thinking process is at best always warped, if not often mortally wounded, by our biases, predisposition, and measures of ignorance. It means that we often cannot efficiently solve problems unless we first solve for ourselves, and that’s not easy to do for a bunch of fish who are steeped in the waters cognitive.

References

Astleitner, H. (2002). Teaching Critical Thinking Online. Journal of Instructional Psychology, 29(2), 53-76.

Choy, S.C. & Cheah, P.K. (2009). Teacher perceptions of critical thinking among students and its influence on higher education. International Journal of Teaching and Learning in Higher Education, 20(2), 198-206.

Kuhn, D. (1999). A developmental model of critical thinking. Educational Researcher, 28(2), 16-25.

Madhavi, M. (2014). An Overview: Metacognition in Education. International Journal of Multidisciplinary and Current Research, 2.


The Power of Social Discourse While Teaching Online during a Pandemic: Using an Online Discussion Board to Engage Metacognition

by Gina Burkart, Ed.D., Learning Specialist, Clarke University

The recent shift to online learning has resulted in class discussions taking place on an online discussion board; while some may not realize it, the discussion board can be a strategic resource for facilitating metacognition in the classroom (Burkart, 2010). This practice is supported by a range of pedagogical research. Eflkides (2008) reminded us of the interrelatedness of self and social within the workings of metacognition. And, research shows that metacognition grows based on the continuous flow of information through cognitive systems of self and other. This growth is further enriched through the use of language for reflection upon and communication of these processes with others (Efklides, 2008; Burkart, 2010; Ruffman, Slade, & Crow, 2002). Additionally, assigned discussion on the online discussion board fulfills the criteria that VanZile-Tamsen and Livingston (1999) found to increase positive motivation in students: self-efficacy, sense of control, relevance, emphasis on learning.

silhouette image of 4 people with one talking and the others listening

Creating Metacognitive Prompts

Key to the success of this approach is the creation of effective discussion prompts. Fostering metacognitive awareness and self-regulation begins with a reflection of self within the context of the course curriculum and then calls for a reflection of self through the lens of others by prompting for a response to a classmate’s discussion post (Burkart, 2010). In a literature course this might look something like:

“Which character of the story did you relate with most? Why? Also, respond to one of your classmates using text from the story for support.”

In responding to another student’s post, students see themselves through the lens of other. Crossley (2000) reminded us in her explorations of narrative analysis that reflection of self is also social. How we see ourselves “relies on the feedback and evaluations we receive from others” (p. 12). Crossley (2000), like Bogdan and Biklen (2003), used George Herbert Mead’s (1962/1934) research on self. She referred to Mead’s (1962/1934) metaphor of “the looking glass self” (p. 12) to illustrate our tendency to see ourselves through the eyes of others. To further this metaphor, one might imagine the online discussion board as “a looking glass self.” This provides instructors and students with a useful tool for not only examining how students perceive their selves and their learning, but also for how students interact with others and influence each other as they engage in the reflexive behavior of learning (Burkart, 2010).

Looking at students’ responses to each other allows students to use their classmates’ experiences to frame their own experiences. For example, consider the following student’s response to a classmate:

I’ve struggled with my anxiety as well and test taking has always been my weakness. Maybe if you try to relax and take deep breathes in and out before a test it can help with your test anxiety. This has helped me in the past, by doing this I realized that I was more calm than usual especially when I try to get my mind off things.

By sharing awareness of their own anxiety and struggles, the student is reflecting upon herself in relation to the other student’s experience. The student then reflects upon strategies that she has tried and offers the other student guidance. This online sharing allows the student to find value in strategies that she has already tried and also reinforces to both students (and the entire class) that they are not alone in their struggles with anxiety.

In this reflexive and reflective behavior, students are metacognitively making choices about their behaviors and their classmates’ behaviors without realizing they are engaging in metacognition. This shows that curriculum can seamlessly embed metacognition into learning, and the online discussion board is a useful tool for doing so.

Student Discussion as a Tool for Monitoring Metacognitive Processing

As a professor, the online discussion is also a tool for monitoring students’ metacognitive processing. It allows teachers to adjust teaching based on the needs of the class, i.e. engage in metacognitive instruction. For example, after seeing several posts and responses regarding anxiety, I often choose to focus on anxiety and resources for dealing with anxiety and test anxiety in the next class period. In this regard, the discussion board also becomes an important tool in meta-motivational monitoring (Miele & Scholer, 2018). It allows the professor to oversee the accuracy of the students’ “self, task and strategy knowledge” (p. 3) and intervene or reinforce through responses to the students on the discussion board or in shaping and/or reshaping of curriculum in the classroom.

For example, in an introductory literature course, the discussion board was used to help students reflect on self and how self unfolded in their narratives while they used literary techniques and strategies to shape their narratives and connect with an audience. They also were to reflect specifically on the writing and revision process. After students wrote their creative nonfiction narrative, they were asked to respond to the following question in 150 words and then to a classmate’s post in 50 words:

“What new self-epiphanies emerged for you while writing and revising your narrative?”

The student responses to the prompt revealed that the creative nonfiction narrative assignment was a powerful tool for metacognition in that it made them think about their writing choices more intentionally. In the revision and editing processes, the students had to rethink self and rethink the shape of their narrative and how they told it based on feedback they received from their audience. This online activity guided students in a powerful metacognitive reflection while they commented on how their story connected or did not connect with an audience, revisions they would make in the use of literary devices to better connect with their audience, and revisions they needed to make in writing technique.

With each reading of their narrative and reflection of comments from classmates in regards to their narratives, the students reflected on self and perception of self. Additionally, students reflected on self while they read each other’ posts and comments. As mentioned previously, this reflexive, mirror effect also results in a metacognitive reflection of self. When students read about how other students are changing and growing, they are prompted to reflect on and make similar changes of self. Thus, self, revision of the narrative, revision of technique, revision of the narrative, and revision of writing all became intertwined on the discussion board and prompted metacognitive growth.

References

Bogdan, R. C., & Biklen, S. K. (2003). Qualitative research for education: An introduction to theories and methods (4th ed). Boston: Pearson Education Group, Inc.

Burkart, G. (2010, Dec). First-Year College Student Beliefs about Writing Embedded in Online Discourse: An Analysis and Its Implications to Literacy Learning. (Unpublished doctoral  dissertation). University of Northern Iowa, Cedar Falls, IA.

Burkart, G. (2010, May). An analysis of online discourse and its application to literacy learning, The Journal of Literacy and Learning. Retrieved from http://www.literacyandtechnology.org/uploads/1/3/6/8/136889/jlt_v11_1.pdf#page=64

Crossley, M. (2000). Introducing narrative psychology: Self, trauma, and the construction of meaning. Philadelphia, PA: Open University Press.

Efklides, A. (2008). Metacognition: Defining its facets and levels of functioning in relation to self-regulation and co-regulation. European Psychologist, 13 (4), 277-287. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232452693_Metacognition_Defining_Its_Facets_ad_Levels_of_Functioning_in_Relation_to_Self-Regulation_and_Co-regulation

Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self, and society: From the standpoint of a social behaviorist.

Miele, D. B. & Scholer, A. A. (2018). The role of metamotivational monitoring in motivation regulation, Educational Psychologist, 53(1), 1-21.

Ruffman, T., Slade, L., & Crowe, E. (2002). The relation between children’s and mothers’ mental state language and theory-of-mind understanding. Child Development, 73, 734-751.

VanZile-Tamsen, C. & Livingston, Jennifer. J. A. (1999). The differential impact of motivation on the self-regulated strategy use of high- and low-achieving college student. Journal of College Student Develompment, (40)1, 54-60. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232503812_The_differential_impact_of_motivation_on_the_self-regulated_strategy_use_of_high-_and_low-achieving_college_students


Psychological Myths are Hurting Metacognition

by Dana Melone, Cedar Rapids Kennedy High School

Every year I start my psychology class by asking the students some true or false statements about psychology. These statements are focused on widespread beliefs about psychology and the capacity to learn that are not true or have been misinterpreted.  Here are just a few:

  • Myth 1: People learn better when we teach to their true or preferred learning style
  • Myth 2: People are more right brained or left brained
  • Myth 3: Personality tests can determine your personality type

Many of these myths are still widely believed and used in the classroom, in staff professional development, in the workplace to make employment decisions, and so much more.  Psychological myths in the classroom hurt metacognition and learning.  All of these myths allow us to internalize a particular aspect of ourselves we believe must be true, and this seeps into our cognition as we examine our strengths and weaknesses. 

Myth 1: People learn better when we teach to their true or preferred learning styles

The learning style myth persists.  A Google search of learning styles required me to proceed to page three of the search before finding information on the fallacy of the theory.  The first two pages of the search contained links to tests to find your learning style, and how to use your learning style as a student and at work.  In Multiple Intelligences, by Howard Gardner (1983), the author developed the theory of multiple intelligences.  His idea theorizes that we have multiple types of intelligences (kinesthetic, auditory, visual, etc.) that work in tandem to help us learn.  In the last 30 years his idea has become synonymous with learning styles, which imply we each have one predominant way that we use to learn.  There is no research to support this interpretation of learning styles, and Gardner himself has discussed the misuse of his theory.  If we perpetuate this learning styles myth as educators, employees, or employers, we are setting ourselves up and the people we influence to believe they can only learn in the fashion that best suits them. This is a danger to metacognition.  For example, if I am examining why I did poorly on my last math test and I believe I am a visual learner, I may attribute my poor grade to my instructor’s use of verbal presentation instead of accurately reflecting on the errors I made in studying or calculation. 

image of human brain with list of major functions of the left and right hemispheres

Myth 2: People are more right brained or left brained

Research on the brain indicates a possible difference between the right and left-brain functions.  Most research up to this point examines the left brain as our center for spoken and written language while the right brain controls visual, imagery, and imaginative functions among others.  The research does not indicate, however, that a particular side works alone on this task.  This knowledge of the brain has led to the myth that if we perceive ourselves as better at a particular topic like art for example, we must be more right brained.  In one of numerous studies dispelling this myth, researchers used Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) to examine the brain while completing various “typical” right and left brained tasks.  This research clearly showed what psychologists and neurologists have known for some time.  The basic functions may lie in those areas, but the two sides of the brain work together to complete these tasks (Nielsen, Zielenski, et. al., 2013). How is this myth hurting metacognition?  Like Myth 1, if we believe we are predetermined to a stronger functioning on particular tasks, we may avoid tasks that don’t lie with that strength.  We may also use incorrect metacognition in thinking that we function poorly on something because of our “dominant side.” 

Myth 3: Personality tests can determine your personality type

In the last five years I have been in a variety of work-related scenarios where I have been given a personality test to take.  These have ranged from providing me with a color that represents me or a series of letters that represents me.  In applying for jobs, I have also been asked to undertake a personality inventory that I can only assume weeds out people they feel don’t fit the job at hand.  The discussion / reflection process following these tests is always the same.  How might your results indicate a strength or weakness for you in your job and in your life, and how might this affect how you work with people who do and do not match the symbolism you were given?   Research shows that we tend to agree with the traits we are given if those traits contain a general collection of mostly positive and but also a few somewhat less positive characteristics. However, we need to examine why we are agreeing.  We tend not to think deeply when confirming our own beliefs, and we may be accidentally eliminating situational aspects from our self-metacognition.  This is also true when we evaluate others. We shouldn’t let superficial assumptions based on our awareness of our own or someone else’s personality test results overly control our actions. For example, it would be short-sighted to make employment decisions or promotional decisions based on assumptions that, because someone is shy, they would not do well with a job that requires public appearances. 

Dispelling the Myths

The good news is that metacognition itself is a great way to get students and others to let go of these myths. I like to address these myths head on.  A quick true false exercise can get students thinking about their current beliefs on these myths. Then I get them talking and linking with better decision-making processes.  For example, I ask what is the difference between a theory or correlation and an experiment?  An understanding of what makes good research and what might just be someone’s idea based on observation is a great way to get students thinking about these myths as well as all research and ideas they encounter.  Another great way to induce metacognition on these topics is to have students take quizzes that determine their learning style, brain side, and personality.  Discuss the results openly and engage students in critical thinking about the tests and their results.  How and why do they look to confirm the results?  More importantly what are examples of the results not being true for them?  There are also a number of amazing Ted Talks, articles and podcasts on these topics that get students thinking in terms of research instead of personal examples. Let’s take it beyond students and get the research out there to educators and companies as well.   Here are just a few resources you might use:

Hidden Brain Podcast: Can a Personality Test Tell Us About Who We Are?: https://www.npr.org/2017/12/04/568365431/what-can-a-personality-test-tell-us-about-who-we-are

10 Myths About Psychology Debunked: Ben Ambridge: https://tedsummaries.com/2015/02/12/ben-ambridge-10-myths-about-psychology-debunked/

The Left Brain VS. Right Brain Myth: Elizabeth Waters: https://ed.ted.com/lessons/the-left-brain-vs-right-brain-myth-elizabeth-waters

Learning Styles and the Importance of Critical Self-Reflection: Tesia Marshik: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=855Now8h5Rs

The Myth of Catering to Learning Styles: Joanne K. Olsen: https://www.nsta.org/publications/news/story.aspx?id=52624


Metacognitions About a Robot

by Roman Taraban, Ph.D., Texas Tech University

Imagine a time when intelligent robots begin interacting with humans in sophisticated ways. Is this a bit farfetched? Probably not, as there already exist compelling examples of just that. Sophia, a robot, so impressed her Saudi audience at an investment summit in 2017 that she was granted Saudi citizenship. Nadine, another robot, is an emotionally intelligent companion whose “intelligent behavior is almost indistinguishable from that of a human”. The coming exponential rise of artificial intelligence into all aspects of human behavior requires a consideration of possible consequences. If a machine is a billion times more intelligent than a human, as some predict will happen by 2045, what will cognitive and social interactions with such superhuman machines be like? Chris Frith (2012) argues that a remarkable human capacity is metacognition that concerns others. However, what if the “other” is an intelligent machine, like a robot. Is metacognition about a robot feasible? That is the question posed here. Four aspects of metacognition are considered: the metacognitive experience, theory of mind, teamwork, and trust. Other aspects could be considered, but these four should be sufficient to get a sense of the human-machine metacognitive possibilities.

robot and human hand fist bump

Flavell (1979) defined metacognitive experiences as follows: “Metacognitive experiences are any conscious cognitive or affective experiences that accompany and pertain to any intellectual enterprise. An example would be the sudden feeling that you do not understand something another person just said” (p. 906). Other examples include wondering whether you understand what another person is doing, or believing that you are not adequately communicating how you feel to a friend. We can easily apply these examples to intelligent machines. For instance, I might have a sudden feeling that I did not understand what a robot said, I might wonder if I am understanding what a robot is doing, or I may believe that I am communicating poorly with the robot. So it appears to be safe to conclude that we can have metacognitive experiences involving robots.

Other instances of metacognition involving intelligent machines, like robots, are problematic. Take, for instance, mentalizing or Theory of Mind. In mentalizing, we take account (monitor) of others’ mental states and use that knowledge to predict (control) others’ and our own behavior. In humans, the ability to reason about the mental states of others emerges between the ages of 4 to 6 years and continues to develop across the lifespan. In a typical test of this ability, a child observes a person place an object in drawer A. The person then leaves the room. The child observes another person move the object to drawer B. When the first person returns, the child is asked to predict where the person will look for the object. Predicting drawer A is evidence that the child can think about what the other person believes, and that the child recognized that the other person’s beliefs may not be the same as the child’s own knowledge. Theory of mind metacognition directed towards humans is effective and productive; however, theory of mind metacognition directed to intelligent machines is not likely to work. The primary reason is that theory of mind is predicated on having a model of the other person and being able to simulate the experience of the other person. Because intelligent machines process information using algorithms and representations that differ from those humans use, it is not possible to anticipate the “thinking” of these machines and therefore predict their behavior in a metacognitive manner, i.e., having a theory of the other mind. Presently, for instance, intelligent machines use deep learning networks and naïve Bayes algorithms to “think” about a problem. The computational methods employed by these machines differ from those employed by humans.

What about teamwork? According to Frith (2012), humans are remarkable in their ability to work together in groups. Teamwork accounts for humans’ incredible achievements. The ability to work together is due, in large part, to metacognition. The specific factor cited by Frith is individuals’ willingness to share and explain the metacognitive considerations that prompted their decision-making behavior. For group work to succeed, participants need to know the goals, values, and intentions of others in the group. As has been pointed out already, machine intelligence is qualitatively different from human knowledge, so that is one barrier to human-machine group work. Further, the benefits of group work depend on a sense of shared responsibility. It is currently unknown whether or how a sense of cooperation and shared responsibility would occur in human-machine decision making and behavior.

There is one more concern related to machine intelligence that is separate from the fact that machines “think” in qualitatively different ways compared to humans. It is an issue of trust. In some cases of social interaction, understanding information that is being presented is not an issue. We may understand the message, but wonder if our assessment of the source of the information is reliable. Flavell (1979) echoed this case when he wrote: “In many real-life situations, the monitoring problem is not to determine how well you understand what a message means but to determine how much you ought to believe it or do what it says to do” (p. 910). When machines get super smart, will we be able to trust them? Benjamin Kuipers suggests the following: “For robots to be acceptable participants in human society, they will need to understand and follow human social norms.  They also must be able to communicate that they are trustworthy in the many large and small collaborations that make up human society” https://vimeo.com/253813907 .

What role will metacognitions about super-intelligent machines have in the future? Here I argue that we will have metacognitive experiences involving these machines. Those experiences will occur when we monitor and regulate our interactions with the machines. However, it is not clear that we will be able to attain deeper aspects of metacognition, like theory of mind. This is because the computations underlying machine intelligence are qualitatively different from human computation. Finally, will we be able to trust robots with our wealth, our children, our societies, our lives? That will depend on how we decide to regulate the construction, training, and deployment of super intelligent machines. Flavell (1979) often brings in affect, emotion, and feelings, into the discussion of metacognitive experiences. Kuipers emphasizes the notion of trust and ethics. These are all factors that computer scientists have not begun to address in their models of intelligent machine metacognition (Anderson & Oates, 2007; Cox, 2005). Hopefully solutions can be found, in order to enable rich and trustworthy relationships with smart machines.

References

Anderson, M. L., & Oates, T. (2007). A review of recent research in metareasoning and metalearning. AI Magazine, 28(1), 12.

Cox, M. T. (2005). Field review: Metacognition in computation: A selected research review. Artificial intelligence, 169(2), 104-141.

Flavell, John H. (1979). Metacognition and cognitive monitoring. American Psychologist, 34(10), 906-911.

Frith, C. D. (2012). The role of metacognition in human social interactions. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 367(1599), 2213-2223.


Pausing Mid-Stride: Mining Metacognitive Interruptions In the Classroom

By Amy Ratto Parks, Ph.d., University of Montana

Metacognitive interventions are often the subject of research in educational psychology because researchers are curious about how these planned, curricular changes might impact the development of metacognitive skills over time. However, as a researcher in the fields of metacognition and rhetoric and composition, I am sometimes struck by the fact that the planned nature of empirical research makes it difficult for us to take advantage of important kairic moments in learning.

The rhetorical term kairic, taken from the Greek concept of kairos, generally represents a fortuitous window in time in which to take action toward a purpose. In terms of learning, kairic moments are those perfect little slivers in which we might suddenly gain insight into our own or our students’ learning. In the classroom, I like to think of these kairic moments as metacognitive interruptions rather than interventions because they aren’t planned ahead of time. Instead, the “interruptions” arise out of the authentic context of learning. Metacognitive interruptions are kairic moments in which we, as teachers, might be able to briefly access a point in which the student’s metacognitive strategies have either served or not served them well.

A few days ago I experienced a very typical teaching moment that turned out to be an excellent example of a fruitful metacognitive interruption: I asked the students to take out their homework and the moment I began asking discussion questions rooted in the assignment, I sensed that something was off. I saw them looking at each other’s papers and whispering across the tables, so I asked what was going on. One brave student said, “I think a bunch of us did the homework wrong.”

They were supposed to have completed a short analysis of a peer-reviewed article titled, “The Daily Show Effect: Candidate Evaluations, Efficacy, and American Youth” (Baumgartner & Morris, 2014). I got out the assignment sheet and asked the brave student, Rasa*, to read it aloud. She said, “For Tuesday, September 15. Read The Daily Show Effect: Candidate Evaluations…. oh wait. I see what happened. I read the other Jon Stewart piece in the book.” Another student jumped in and said, “I just analyzed the whole show” and a third said, “I analyzed Jon Stewart.”

In that moment, I experienced two conflicting internal reactions. The teacher in me was annoyed. How could this simple set of directions have caused confusion? And how far was this confusion going to set us back? If only half of the class had done the work, the rest of my class plan was unlikely to go well. However, the researcher in me was fascinated. How, indeed, had this simple set of instructions caused confusion? All of these students had completed a homework assignment, so they weren’t just trying to “get out of work.” Plus, they also seemed earnestly unsure about what had gone wrong.

The researcher in me won out. I decided to let the class plan go and I began to dig into the situation. By a show of hands I saw that 12 of the 22 students had done the correct assignment and 10 had completed some customized, new version of the homework. I asked them all to pause for a moment and engage in a metacognitive activity: they were to think back to moment they read the assignment and ask themselves, where did I get mixed up?

Rasa said that she just remembered me saying something about The Daily Show in class, and when she looked in the table of contents, she saw a different article, “Political Satire and Postmodern Irony in the Age of Stephen Colbert and Jon Stewart” (Colletta, 2014), and read it instead. Other students said that they must not have read closely enough, but then another student said something interesting. She said, “I did read the correct essay, but it sounded like it was going to be too hard to analyze and I figured that you hadn’t meant for this to be so hard, so I just analyzed the show.” Other students nodded in agreement. I asked the group to raise their hands if had read the correct essay. Many hands went up. Then I asked if they thought that the analysis they chose to do was easier than the one I assigned. All of them raised their hands.

Again, I was fascinated. In this very short conversation I had just watched rich, theoretical research play out before me. First, here was an example of the direct effect of power browsing (Kandra, Harden, & Babbra, 2012) mistakenly employed in the academic classroom. Power browsing is a relatively recently coined term that describes “skimming and scanning through text, looking for key words, and jumping from source to source” (Kandra et al., 2012).  Power browsing can be a powerful overviewing strategy (Afflerbach & Cho, 2010) in an online reading environment where a wide variety of stimuli compete for the reader’s attention. Research shows that strong readers of non-electronic texts also employ pre-reading or skimming strategies (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009), however, when readers mistakenly power browse in academic settings, it may result in “in missed opportunities or incomplete knowledge” (Kandra et al., 2012, par. 18). About metacognition and reading strategies, Afflerbach and Cho (2010) write, “the good strategy user is always aware of the context of reading” (p. 206); clearly, some of my students had forgotten their reading context. Some of the students knew immediately that they hadn’t thoroughly read the assignment. As soon as I described the term “power browse” their faces lit up. “Yes!” said, Rasa, “that’s exactly what I did!” Here was metacognition in action.

Second, as students described the reasoning behind choosing to read the assigned essay, but analyze something unassigned, I heard them offering a practical example of Flower and Hayes’ (1981/2011) discussion of goal-setting in the writing process. Flower and Hayes (1981/2011) said that writing includes, “not only the rhetorical situation and audience which prompts one to write, it also includes the writer’s own goals in writing” (p. 259). They went on to say that although some writers are able to “juggle all of these demands” others “frequently reduce this large set of restraints to a radically simplified problem” (p. 259). Flower and Hayes allow that this can sometimes cause problems, but they emphasize that “people only solve the problems they set for themselves” (p. 259).

Although I had previously seen many instances of students “simplifying” larger writing assignments in my classroom, I had never before had a chance to talk with students about what had happened in the moment when they realized something hadn’t worked. But here, they had just openly explained to me that the assignment had seemed too difficult, so they had recalibrated, or “simplified” it into something they thought they could do well and/or accomplish during their given timeframe.

This metacognitive interruption provided an opportunity to “catch” students in the moment when their learning strategies had gone awry, but my alertness to the kairic moment only came as a result of my own metacognitive skills: when it became clear that the students had not completed the work correctly, I paused before reacting and that pause allowed me to be alert to a possible metacognitive learning opportunity. When I began to reflect on this class period, I realized that my own alertness came as a result of my belief in the importance of teachers being metacognitive professionals so that we can interject learning into the moment of processing.

There is yet one more reason to mine these metacognitive interruptions: they provide authentic opportunities to teach students about metacognition and learning. The scene I described here could have had a very different outcome. It can be easy to see student behavior in a negative light. When students misunderstand something we thought we’d made clear, we sometimes make judgments about them being “lazy” or “careless” or “belligerent.” In this scenario it seems like it would have been justifiable to have gotten frustrated and lectured the students about slowing down, paying attention to details, and doing their homework correctly.

Instead, I was able to model the kind of cognitive work I would actually want to teach them: we slowed down and studied the mistake in a way that led the class to a conversation about how our minds work when we learn. Rather than including a seemingly-unrelated lecture on “metacognition in learning” I had a chance to teach them in response to a real moment of misplaced metacognitive strategy. Our 15-minute metacognitive interruption did not turn out to be a “delay” in the class plan, but an opening into a kind of learning that might sometimes just have to happen when the moment presents itself.

References

Baumgartner, J., & Morris, J., (2014). The Daily Show effect: Candidate evaluations, efficacy, and American youth. In C. Cucinella (Ed.), Funny. Southlake, Fountainhead Press. (Reprinted from American Politics Journal, 34(3), (2006), pp.341-67).

Colletta, L. (2014). Political satire and postmodern irony in the age of Stephen Colbert and Jon Stewart. In C. Cucinella (Ed.), Funny. Southlake, Fountainhead Press. (Reprinted from The Journal of Popular Culture, 42(5), (2009), pp. 856-74).

Dunlosky, J., & Metcalfe, J. (2009). Metacognition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Flower, L., & Hayes, J. (2011). A cognitive process theory of writing. In V. Villanueva & K. Arola (Eds.), Cross-talk in comp theory: A reader, (3rd ed.), (pp. 253-277). Urbana, IL: NCTE. (Reprinted from College Composition and Communication, 32(4), (Dec., 1981), pp. 365-387).

Kandra, K. L., Harden, M., & Babbra, A. (2012). Power browsing: Empirical evidence at the college level. National Social Science Journal, 2, article 4. Retrieved from http://www.nssa.us/tech_journal/volume_2-2/vol2-2_article4.htm

Waters, H. S., & Schneider, W., (Eds.). (2010). Metacognition, strategy use, and instruction. New York, NY: The Guilford Press.

* Names have been changed to protect the students’ privacy.


Interest Beyond the Ivory Tower

by David Westmoreland, U.S. Air Force Academy*

I recently had a speaking engagement at a local pub which took an interesting turn related to metacognition. “Science on Tap” is a loosely organized program that takes place in cities around the United States, in which people with an interest in science can meet with a scientist to learn about current developments. The topic that I chose to cover was not current at all – in fact, it was a historical narrative set in England during the 1870s. The story revolved a public challenge to prove that the earth is a sphere, as opposed to being flat, which was published in the journal Scientific Opinion. The author of the challenge, John Hampden, was a biblical literalist who offered to match a wager up to £500 (over $30,000 in today’s dollars) that would be held by an independent party until that person determined whether the burden of evidence had been met. The bet was picked up by Alfred Russel Wallace, who used a simple demonstration involving nothing more than wooden stakes with flags, a telescope, and a surveyor’s level to win. Those interested in the details of the story can find them in Schadewald (1978).

My intent in presenting the story was to engage the audience in the process of scientific reasoning – rather than presenting Wallace’s solution, I challenged those sharing a table to come up with a convincing demonstration using the same tools that Wallace employed. They succeeded, converging on a common theme similar to the one that Wallace used. In the Q & A that followed, the audience was clearly more interested in questions about the nature of thinking than in historical details. What is happening when two people view the same evidence and come to opposite conclusions? How often does a person make a deliberate attempt to view evidence through the lens of another? When someone rejects data in order to retain a belief, has rationalism been abandoned? The discussion was lively, engaging, and ultimately had to be cut off as we ran out of time. For me, it drove home the point that metacognitive thinking is of broad interest, not relegated to the halls of the academy.

Reference

Robert Schadewald. 1978. He knew the earth is round, but his proof fell flat. Smithsonian Magazine 9 (April), 101-113.

* Disclaimer: The views expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U. S. Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U. S. Govt.


Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments

This sometimes humorous article by Justin Kruger and David Dunning describes a series of four experiments that “that incompetent individuals have more difficulty recognizing their true level of ability than do more competent individuals and that a lack of metacognitive skills may underlie this deficiency.”  It also includes a nice review of the literature and several examples to support their study.

Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1999, Vol. 77, No. 6. 121-1134


The Six Hour D… And How to Avoid It

This great essay by Russ Dewey (1997) evolved from a handout he used to give his students. He shares some common examples of poor study strategies and explains why they are unlikely to lead to deep learning (even if they are used for 6 hours…). He then shares a simple metacognitive self-testing strategy that could be tailored for courses across the disciplines.

http://www.psywww.com/discuss/chap00/6hourd.htm


Faculty Metacognition of Verbal Questioning

by Charity Peak, U.S. Air Force Academy*

Few faculty would argue that teaching requires asking questions of students, but rarely do instructors consider the what, how, or why of their verbal questioning behavior.  Without metacognition of questioning strategies, this foundational instructional technique can be wasted on habit rather than design.

Faculty question students for a variety of reasons.  Surprisingly, most faculty use verbal questioning as a classroom management technique.  This might look something like a machine gun approach, firing question after question in multiple directions in an effort to keep the class engaged.  See a student dozing? Fire!  Someone checking Facebook? Fire!  Some researchers estimate that teachers ask as many as 120 questions per hour—a question every 30 seconds (Vogler, 2005)!While this strategy may keep students on their toes, it does not necessarily aid student learning.  Often these questions are low level cognitive questions, requiring mainly recall of factual knowledge.  If teachers wish to develop deeper levels of thinking, they must stimulate their students’ own evaluation of the content rather than merely requesting regurgitation of the basics.

At the other end of the spectrum is a master teacher’s approach to instruction that utilizes a specific questioning taxonomy proven to be effective for a variety of disciplines.  Rather than using the run-and-gun approach, this faculty member masterfully leads students from one point to another through a series of thoughtfully derived questions.  He or she might start with the big picture and lead to a specific point or, in contrast, begin with minutia but guide students to one main relevant theme by the end of class.  Watching these instructors in action is often humbling.  However, even these most masterful teachers are often not cognitively aware of the strategies they are using.  They have figured out what works over time, but they likely can’t point to a specific methodology they were using to support their instruction.  Rather than shooting in the dark over many years, faculty would be wise to understand the metacognition behind verbal questioning if they wish to be effective in creating higher order thinking in their students.

Moving beyond simple recall in questioning is certainly good advice for creating more opportunities in thinking, but it’s easier said than done.  Faculty often report feeling uncomfortable trying new questioning strategies.  Asking higher order thinking questions for application, analysis, and synthesis often creates extensive dead air time in the classroom.  More difficult questions require more time to think, often in silence.  Also, students are reluctant to change the very well-established classroom culture of “getting the answer right.”  Based on years of classroom experience, students will often fire answers back, playing the game of “Guess what’s in the teacher’s head.”

Despite these cultural norms, it is possible through metacognition to improve verbal questioning.  Some scholars argue that faculty should understand some of the basic questioning taxonomies that exist and how they influence learning.  For example, asking open-ended versus closed-ended questions will alter the cognitive level of thinking and response (Rothstein & Santana, 2011).  Open-ended questions tend to achieve thinking which is higher on Bloom’s Taxonomy.  Students are required to generate thoughtful answers to questions as opposed to firing one to three word facts.  For example, instead of asking, “What is an adverb?” faculty might ask students to apply their learning by identifying an adverb in a sentence or even creating their own sentences using adverbs.  Better yet, The Right Question Institute (Rothstein & Santana, 2011) encourages faculty to get students to ask their own questions rather than teachers doing all the work.  After all, the person generating the questions is arguably the person who is learning the most.

Other scholars suggest that faculty should consider the sequencing and patterns that are possible when asking questions (Vogler, 2005).  For example, cognitive psychologists often suggest a funneling or convergent questioning technique, which leads students from big picture to details because it mirrors the cognitive functioning of the brain.  However, depending on the subject area, faculty may find success in guiding students from narrow to broad thinking (divergent) by first asking low-level, general questions followed by higher-level, specific questions.  Some disciplines lend themselves to using a circular path to force critical thinking in students.  This pattern asks a series of questions which eventually lead back to the initial position or question (e.g., “What is justice?”).  While students often find these patterns frustrating, it emphasizes to students the value of thinking rather than correctly identifying the right answer.

Ultimately, though, faculty would be wise to spend less energy on the exact strategy they plan to use and instead focus on the main goals of their questioning.  In Making Thinking Visible (Ritchhart, Church, & Morrison, 2011), the authors propose that the purpose of questioning is really to make our students’ thinking visible by understanding our own expert-level thinking—aka metacognition.   To do this, the authors suggest that instead of complex taxonomies and patterns, we should focus our efforts on three main purposes for questioning in our classes:

  1. Modeling our interest in the ideas being explored
  2. Helping students to construct understanding
  3. Facilitating the illumination of students’ own thinking to themselves (i.e., metacognition)

By asking authentic questions – that is, questions to which the teacher does not already know the answer or to which there are not predetermined answers – instructors create a classroom culture that feels intellectually engaging, fosters a community of inquiry, and allows students to see teachers as learners (31).  Faculty must frame learning as a complex communal activity rather than the process of merely accumulating information.  Thoughtful questioning creates this classroom climate of inquiry, but only if faculty are metacognitive about their purpose and approach to using this critical pedagogical strategy.  Without metacognition, faculty risk relying on the machine gun approach to questioning, wasting valuable class time on recall of factual information rather than elevating and revealing students’ thinking.

Ritchhart, R., Church, M., and Morrison, K. (2011). Making thinking visible: How to promote engagement, understanding, and independence for all learners. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Rothstein, D., and Santana, L. (2011). Make just one change: Teach students to ask their own questions. Boston: Harvard Education Press.

Vogler, K. E. (2005). Improve your verbal questioning. The Clearing House, 79(2): 98-103.

 

* Disclaimer: The views expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U. S. Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U. S. Govt.