Author: John Draeger

Using Just-in-Time assignments to promote metacognition

by John Draeger (SUNY Buffalo State)

In a previous post entitled “Just-in-time for metacognition,” I argued that Just-in-Time teaching techniques could be used to promote both higher-order-thinking and metacognition. Just-in-time teaching techniques require that students submit short assignments prior to class for review by the instructor before class begins (Novak 1999; Simkins & Maier, 2009; Schraff et al., 2011). In my philosophy courses, students send their answers to me electronically the night before class and I spend the morning of class using their answers to shape my pre-class planning. I’ve had success with higher-order-thinking questions, but I tended to ask students questions about their learning process only when the class had clearly gone off track. Since I’ve become convinced that developing good metacognitive habits requires practice, I’ve made metacognitive questions a regular component of my Just-in-Time assignments. In this post, I thought I would let you know how things are going.

Research shows that students learn more effectively when they are aware of their own learning process (I encourage you to surf around this site for examples). Borrowing from Tanner (2012) and Scharff (2014), I have asked students to think about why and how they engage in various learning strategies (e.g., reading, writing, reflecting). More specifically, I have asked: what was the most challenging part of the reading? Was the current reading more challenging than the last? What was the most useful piece of the reading? What was the most challenging piece of the reading? What was your reading strategy this week? How might you approach the reading differently next time? What was the most challenging part of the last writing assignment? How might you approach your next writing assignment differently? What are your learning goals for the week?

Responses from students at all levels have been remarkably similar. In particular, student responses fall into three broad categories: general student commentary (e.g., about the course, reading, particular assignment), content (e.g., students reframe the metacognition question and answer with use of course content), reflective practice (e.g., students actually reflect on their learning process).

First Type of Response: General Commentary

  • When asked to describe the most challenging part of the reading, students took the opportunity to observe that the reading too long, too boring, or it was interesting but confusing.
  • When asked to describe the most useful part of the reading, students often said that the question was difficult to answer because the reading was too long, too boring, or it was interesting but confusing.
  • When asked about their reading strategy, students observed that they did their best but the reading was too long, too boring, or interesting but confusing.
  • When asked about their learning goals for the week, students said that the question was strange, off the wall, and they had never been asked such a thing before.

Second Type of Response: Content

  • When asked to describe the most challenging part of the reading, students identified particular examples that were hard to follow and claims that seemed dubious.
  • When asked to describe the most useful part of the reading, students often restated the central question of the week (e.g., is prostitution morally permissible? should hate speech be restricted?) or summarized big issues (e.g., liberty argument for the permissibility of prostitution or hate speech).
  • When asked about their reading strategy, students often said that they wanted to understand a particular argument for that day (e.g., abortion, euthanasia, prostitution).
  • When asked their learning goal for the week, students said that they wanted to explore a big question (e.g., the nature of liberty or equality) and put philosophers into conversation (this is a major goal in all my courses).

Third Type of Response: Reflective practice

  • When asked to describe the most challenging part of the reading, students said that they didn’t give themselves enough time, they stretched it over multiple days, or they didn’t do it at all.
  • When asked about the most useful part of the reading, some students said that the reading forced them to challenge their own assumptions (e.g., “I always figured prostitution was disgusting, but maybe not”).
  • When asked about their reading strategies, some said that they had to read the material several times. Some said they skimmed the reading and hoped they could piece it together in class. Others found writing short summaries to be essential.
  • When asked about their learning goals for the week, some students reported wanting to become more open-minded and more tolerant of people with differing points of view.

Responses to the metacognitive prompts have been remarkably similar from students in my freshman to senior level courses. In contrast, I can say that there’s a marked difference by class year in responses to higher-order thinking prompts, possibly because I regularly use student responses to higher-order thinking prompts to structure class discussion. While I gave students some feedback on their metacognitive prompt responses, in the future I could be more intentional about using their responses to structure discussions of the student learning process.

I also need to refine my metacognition-related pre-class questions. For example, asking students to discuss the most challenging part of a reading assignment encourages students to reflect on roadblocks to understanding. The question is open-ended in a way that allows students to locate the difficulty in a particular bit of content, a lack of motivation, or a deficiency in reading strategy. However, if I want them to focus on their learning strategies, then I need to focus the question in ways that prompt that sort of reflection. For example, I could reword the prompt as follows: Identify one challenging passage in the reading this week. Explain why you believe it was difficult to understand. Discuss what learning strategy you used, how you know whether the strategy worked, and what you might do differently next time. Revising the questions so that they have a more explicitly metacognitive focus is especially important given that students are often unfamiliar with metacognitive reflection. If I can be more intentional about how I promote metacognition in my courses, then perhaps there can be gains in the metacognitive awareness demonstrated by my students. I’ll keep you posted.

References

Novak, G., Patterson, E., Gavrin, A., & Christian, W. (1999). Just-in-time teaching: Blending active learning with web technology. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Scharff, L. “Incorporating Metacognitive Leadership Development in Class.” (2014). Retrieved from https://www.improvewithmetacognition.com/incorporating-metacognitive-leadership-development-in-class/.

Scharff, L., Rolf, J. Novotny, S. and Lee, R. (2011). “Factors impacting completion of pre-class assignments (JiTT) in Physics, Math, and Behavioral Sciences.” In C.

Rust (ed.), Improving Student Learning: Improving Student Learning Global Theories and Local Practices: Institutional, Disciplinary and Cultural Variations. Oxford Brookes University, UK.

Simkins, S. & Maier, M. (2009). Just-in-time teaching: Across the disciplines, across the  academy. Stylus Publishing, LLC..

Tanner, K. D. (2012). Promoting student metacognition. CBE-Life Sciences Education, 11(2), 113-120.


Exploring the relationship between awareness, self-regulation, and metacognition

Thinking about thinking, awareness, and self-regulation Share on Xby John Draeger (SUNY Buffalo State)

Recent blog posts have considered the nature of metacognition and metacognitive instruction. Lauren Scharff, for example, defines metacognition as “the intentional and ongoing interaction between awareness and self-regulation” (Scharff, 2015). This post explores the relationship between the elements of this definition.

Scharff observes that a person can recognize that a pedagogical strategy isn’t working without changing her behavior (e.g., someone doesn’t change because she is unaware of alternative strategies) and a person can change her behavior without monitoring its efficacy (e.g., someone tries a technique that she heard about in a workshop without thinking through whether the technique makes sense within a particular learning environment). Scharff argues that a person engaging in metacognition will change her behavior when she recognizes that a change is needed. She will be intentional about when and how to make that change. And she will continue the new behavior only if there’s reason to believe that it is the achieving the desired result. Metacognition, therefore, can be found in the interaction between awareness and self-regulated action. Moreover, because learning environments are fluid, the interaction between awareness and self-regulation must be ongoing. This suggests that awareness and self-regulation are necessary for metacognition.

In response, I offered what might seem to be a contrary view (Draeger, 2015). I argued that the term ‘metacognition’ is vague in two ways. First, it is composed of overlapping sub-elements. Second, each of these sub-elements falls along a continuum. For example, metacognitive instructors can be more (or less) intentional, more (or less) informed about evidence-based practice, more (or less) likely to have alternative strategies ready to hand, and more (or less) nimble with regards to when and how to shift strategies based on their “in the moment” awareness of student need. Sub-elements are neither individually necessary nor jointly sufficient for a full characterization of metacognition. Rather, a practice is metacognitive if it has “enough” of the sub-elements and they are far “enough” along the various continua.

Scharff helpfully suggests that metacognition must involve both awareness and action. I would add that awareness can be divided into sub-elements (e.g., reflection, mindfulness, self-monitoring, self-knowledge) and behavior can be divided into sub-elements (e.g., self-regulation, collective actions, institutional mandates). While I suspect that no one of the sub-elements is individually necessary for metacognition, Scharff has correctly identified two broad clusters of elements that are required for metacognition.

As I continue to think through the relationship between awareness and self-regulation, I am reminded of an analogy between physical exercise and intellectual growth. As I have said in a previous post, I am a gym rat. Among other things, I swim several times a week. A few years ago, however, I noticed that my stroke needed refinement. So, I contacted a swimming instructor. She found a handful of areas where I could improve, including my kick and the angle of my arms. As I worked on these items, it was often helpful to focus on my kick without worrying about the angle of my arms and vice versa. With time and effort, I got gradually better. Because my kick had been atrocious, focusing on that one area resulted in dramatic improvement. Because my arm angle hadn’t been all that bad, improvements were far less dramatic. Working on my kick and my arm angle combined to make me a better swimmer. Separating the various elements of my stroke allowed me to identify areas for improvement and allowed me to tackle my problem areas without feeling overwhelmed. However, even after working on the parts, I found that I still needed to put it together. Eventually, I found a swim rhythm that brought elements into alignment.

Likewise, it is often useful to separate elements of our pedagogical practice (e.g., awareness, self-regulation) because separation allows us identify and target areas in need of improvement. If a person knows what she is doing isn’t working but doesn’t know what else to do, then she might focus on identifying alternative strategies. If a person knows of alternative strategies but does not know when or how to use them, then she might focus on her “in the moment awareness” and her ability to shift to new strategies as needed during class. Focusing on the one element can give a person something concrete to work on without feeling overwhelmed by all the other moving parts. The separation is useful, but it is also somewhat artificial. By analogy, my kick and my arm angle are elements of my swim stroke, but they are also part of an interrelated process. While it is important to improve the parts, the ultimate goal is finding a way to integrate the changes into an effective whole. Metacognitive instructors seek to become more explicit, more intentional, more informed about evidence-based practice, and better able to make “in the moment” adjustments. Focusing on each of these elements can improve practice. Separating these elements can be useful, but somewhat artificial because the ultimate goal is finding a way to integrate these elements into an effective whole.

References

Draeger, John (2015). “So what if ‘metacognition’ is vague!” Retrieved from https://www.improvewithmetacognition.com/so-what-if-metacognition-is-vague/

Scharff, Lauren (2015). “What do we mean by ‘metacognitive instruction?” Retrieved from https://www.improvewithmetacognition.com/what-do-we-mean-by-metacognitive-instruction/

 


So what if ‘metacognition’ is vague!

by John Draeger (SUNY Buffalo State)

When Lauren Scharff invited me to join Improve with Metacognition last year, I was only vaguely aware of what ‘metacognition’ meant. As a philosopher, I knew about various models of critical thinking and I had some inkling that metacognition was something more than critical thought, but I could not have characterized the extra bit. In her post last week, Scharff shared a working definition of ‘metacognitive instruction’ developed by a group of us involved as co-investigators on a project (Scharff, 2015). She suggested that it is the “intentional and ongoing interaction between awareness and self-regulation.” This is better than anything I had a year ago, but I want to push the dialogue further.

I’d like to take a step back to consider the conceptual nature of metacognition by applying an approach in legal philosophy used to analyze terms with conceptual vagueness. While clarity is desirable, Jeremy Waldron argues that there are limits to the level of precision that legal discourse can achieve (Waldron, 1994). This is not an invitation to be sloppy, but rather an acknowledgement that certain legal concepts are inescapably vague. According to Waldron, a concept can be vague in at least two ways. First, particular instantiations can fall along a continuum (e.g., actions can be more or less reckless, negligent, excessive, unreasonable). Second, some concepts can be understood in terms of overlapping features. Democracies, for example, can be characterized by some combination of formal laws, informal patterns of participation, shared history, common values, and collective purpose. These features are neither individually necessary nor jointly sufficient for a full characterization of the concept. Rather, a system of government counts as democratic if it has “enough” of the features. A particular democratic system may look very different from its democratic neighbor. This is in part because particular systems will instantiate the features differently and in part because particular systems might be missing some feature altogether. Moreover, democratic systems can share features with other forms of government (e.g., formal laws, common values, and collective purpose) without there being a clear boundary between democratic and non-democratic forms of government. According to Waldron, there can be vagueness within the concept of democracy itself and in the boundaries between it and related concepts.

While some might worry that the vagueness of legal concepts is a problem for legal discourse, Waldron argues that the lack of precision is desirable because it promotes dialogue. For instance, when considering whether some particular instance of forceful policing should be considered ‘excessive,’ we must consider the conditions under which force is justified and the limits of acceptability. Answering these questions will require exploring the nature of justice, civil rights, and public safety. Dialogue is valuable, in Waldron’s view, because it brings clarity to a broad constellation of legal issues even though clarity about any one of the constituents requires thinking carefully about the other elements in the constellation.

Is ‘metacognition’ vague in the ways that legal concepts can be vague? To answer this question, consider some elements in the metacognitive constellation as described by our regular Improve with Metacognition blog contributors. Self-assessment, for example, is feature of metacognition (Fleisher, 2014, Nuhfer, 2014). Note, however, that it is vague. First, self-assessments may fall along a continuum (e.g., students and instructors can be more or less accurate in their self-assessments). Second, self-assessment is composed of a variety of activities (e.g., predicting exam scores, tracking gains in performance, understanding personal weak spots and understanding one’s own level of confidence, motivation, and interest). These activities are neither individually necessary nor jointly sufficient for a full characterization of self-assessment. Rather, students or instructors are engaged in self-assessment if they engage in “enough” of these activities. Combining these two forms of vagueness, each of the overlapping features can themselves fall along a continuum (e.g., more or less accurate at tracking performance or understanding motivations). Moreover, self-assessment shares features with other related concepts such as self-testing (Taraban, Paniukov, and Kiser, 2014), mindfulness (Was, 2014), calibration (Gutierrez, 2014), and growth mindsets (Peak, 2015). All are part of the metacognitive constellation of concepts. Each of these concepts is individually vague in both senses described above and the boundaries between them are inescapably fuzzy. Turning to Scharff’s description of metacognitive instruction, all four constituent elements (i.e. ‘intentional,’ ‘ongoing interaction,’ ‘awareness,’ and ‘self-regulation’) are also vague in both senses described above. Thus, I believe that ‘metacognition’ is vague in the ways legal concepts are vague. However, if Waldron is right about the benefits of discussing and grappling with vague legal concepts (and I think he is) and if the analogy between vague concepts and the term ‘metacognition’ holds (and I think it does), then vagueness in this case should be perceived as desirable because it facilitates broad dialogue about teaching and learning.

As Improve with Metacognition celebrates its first year birthday, I want to thank all those who have contributed to the conversation so far. Despite the variety of perspectives, each contribution helps us think more carefully about what we are doing and why. The ongoing dialogue can improve our metacognitive skills and enhance our teaching and learning. As we move into our second year, I hope we can continue exploring the rich the nature of the metacognitive constellation of ideas.

References

Fleisher, Steven (2014). “Self-assessment, it’s a good thing to do.” Retrieved from https://www.improvewithmetacognition.com/self-assessment-its-a-good-thing-to-do/

Gutierrez, Antonio (2014). “Comprehension monitoring: the role of conditional knowledge.” Retrieved from https://www.improvewithmetacognition.com/comprehension-monitoring-the-role-of-conditional-knowledge/

Nuhfer, Ed (2014). “Self-Assessment and the affective quality of metacognition Part 1 of 2.”Retrieved from https://www.improvewithmetacognition.com/self-assessment-and-the-affective-quality-of-metacognition-part-1-of-2/

Peak, Charity (2015). “Linking mindset to metacognition.” Retrieved from https://www.improvewithmetacognition.com/linking-mindset-metacognition/

Scharff, Lauren (2015). “What do we mean by ‘metacognitive instruction’?” Retrieved from https://www.improvewithmetacognition.com/what-do-we-mean-by-metacognitive-instruction/

Taraban, Roman, Paniukov, Dmitrii, and Kiser, Michelle (2014). “What metacognitive skills do developmental college readers need? Retrieved from https://www.improvewithmetacognition.com/what-metacognitive-skills-do-developmental-college-readers-need/

Waldron, Jeremy (1994). “Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues.” California Law Review 83(2): 509-540.

Was, Chris (2014). “Mindfulness perspective on metacognition. ”Retrieved from https://www.improvewithmetacognition.com/a-mindfulness-perspective-on-metacognition/

 


Just-in-Time for Metacognition

By John Draeger, SUNY Buffalo State

This post brings metacognition to an already valuable teaching tool. Just-in-time techniques require that students submit short assignments prior to class. Instructors review those answers before class and use them to shape class time. In my philosophy classes, for example, I assign two short questions via a course management system (e.g., Blackboard). At least one of the questions is directly related to the reading. Students are required to submit their answers electronically by 11:00 p.m. the night before class. When I wake up in the morning, I read through their responses and use them to make decisions about how class time will be used. If students seemed to grasp the reading, then I spend less time reviewing the basic arguments and more time exploring deeper content and connections. If student responses displayed a misunderstanding of the reading, then we spend class time carefully examining passages in the text and digging out the relevant arguments.

Just-in-Time techniques have been used in a variety of disciplines and they have been shown to increase the likelihood that students will complete their reading assignments, read more carefully, and take ownership over their learning (Novak 1999; Simkins & Maier, 2009; Schraff et al. 2011). However, just-in-time assignments are typically used to prompt students to complete their assigned reading pages and gauge their basic comprehension. While both are valuable, I argue that the technique can also be used to promote other important skills.

For example, pre-class questions can be used to develop higher-order thinking skills. Students can be asked to examine an author’s point of view, underlying assumptions, or the implications of her view. Such questions prompt students to move beyond their knowledge of what is contained in the text towards active engagement with that text. Students can be asked to apply concepts in the reading (e.g., stereotype bias) to something in the news. And students can be asked to analyze the connections between related course ideas. In a previous post, “Using metacognition to uncover the substructure of moral issues,” I argued that students begin to “think like a philosopher” when they can move beyond the surface content (e.g., hate speech and national security) and towards the underlying philosophical substructure (e.g., rights, well-being, dangers of governmental intrusion). Like other skills, developing higher-order thinking skills requires practice. Because just-in-time assignments are a regular part of a student’s week, incorporating high-order thinking questions into just-in-time assignments can give students regular opportunities to practice and hone those skills.

Likewise, pre-class assignments can give students a regular outlet to practice and develop metacognition. Students can be asked to reflect on how they prepared for class and whether it was effective (Tanner 2012). Pre-class questions might include: how long did you spend with the reading? Did you finish? Did you annotate the text? Did you write a summary of the central argument? Did you formulate questions based on the reading for class discussion? Was this reading more difficult than the previous? If so, why? Did you find yourself having an emotional reaction to the reading? If so, did this help or hinder your ability to understand the central argument? Are your reading techniques adequately preparing you for class? Or, are you finding yourself lost in class discussion despite having spent time doing the reading? If pre-class questions related to higher-order thinking ask students to do more than simply “turn the pages,” then pre-class questions related to metacognition ask students to do more than simply engage with the material, but also engage with their own learning processes.

When just-in-time questions are a regular part of the ebb and flow of a course, students must regularly demonstrate how much they know and instructors can regularly use that information to guide course instruction. These techniques work because there is a consistent accountability measure built-in. I suggest that just-in-time assignments can also be used to give students regular practice developing both higher-order thinking and metacognition skills. I have been incorporating higher-ordering thinking into just-in-time assignments for years, but I confess that I have only given metacognition prompts when things have “gone wrong” (e.g., poor performance on exams, consistent misunderstanding of the reading). Responses to these questions have led to helpful conversation about the efficacy of various learning methods. Writing this blog post has prompted me to see the potential benefits of asking such questions more often. I pledge to do just that and to let you know how my students respond.

 

References

Novak, G., Patterson, E., Gavrin, A., & Christian, W. (1999). Just-in-time teaching: Blending active learning with web technology. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Scharff, L., Rolf, J. Novotny, S. and Lee, R. (2011). “Factors impacting completion of pre-class assignments (JiTT) in Physics, Math, and Behavioral Sciences.” In C. Rust (ed.), Improving Student Learning: Improving Student Learning Global Theories and Local Practices: Institutional, Disciplinary and Cultural Variations. Oxford Brookes University, UK.

Simkins, S. & Maier, M. (2009). Just-in-time teaching: Across the disciplines, across the academy. Stylus Publishing, LLC..

Tanner, K. D. (2012). Promoting student metacognition. CBE-Life Sciences Education, 11(2), 113-120.


Using metacognitive writing assignments to improve course performance

Mynlieff, Manogaran, St. Maurice, and Eddinger discuss the use of metacognitive writing exercises in large biology classes. Students were asked to explicitly consider why they made mistakes on exams and discuss why another answer would have been more appropriate. Students completing these assignments showed marked improvement in subsequent course assessments.

Mynlieff, M., Manogaran, A. L., Maurice, M. S., & Eddinger, T. J. (2014). Writing Assignments with a Metacognitive Component Enhance Learning in a Large Introductory Biology Course. CBE-Life Sciences Education, 13(2), 311-321.

 


Using metacognitive awareness to facilitate healthy engagement with moral issues

By John Draeger, SUNY Buffalo State

As the new semester begins, I am again looking out on a classroom full of students eager to discuss “hot button” moral issues (e.g., abortion, euthanasia, hate-speech, same-sex marriage, drug legalization). In an earlier post entitled, “Using metacognition to uncover the substructure of moral issues,” I argued that metacognitive awareness can help students move beyond media pundit drivel and towards a more careful consideration of moral issues. In “Cultivating the habit of constructive discomfort”, I argued that learning requires cultivating a certain healthy discomfort (much like the discomfort often associated with vigorous exercise) and it is metacognitive awareness that keeps us within our own “zone of proximal development” (Vygotsky 1978). This post considers some of the sources of discomfort that threaten to undermine the discussion of moral issues.

Confronting “hot button” moral issues can be difficult because each of us brings our own complicated history to the conversation (replete with hang ups and blind spots). Based on my many years of teaching moral philosophy, I offer the following list of items that I found seem to derail discussion. The list is by no means exhaustive and whether these are the elements most likely to impede engagement is ultimately an empirical question that the needs to be answered. However, I argue that all of us (instructors, students, those outside the classroom) need to be aware of our own sources of discomfort with moral matters if we hope to move beyond them and towards a healthy engagement with these important issues.

Sources of discomfort: 

(1) Entrenched beliefs— some moral issues are difficult to consider because they force us to confront our foundational values.  For example, those from a wide variety of religious traditions can find it difficult to be completely open-minded to the possibility that abortion and same-sex marriage could be permissible. While they can summarize a particular position on the issue (e.g., for a particular course assignment), many find it difficult to move beyond a “bookish” articulation of the problem towards a genuine consideration of the issues because it threatens to undermine other firmly held beliefs (e.g., religious teachings).

(2) Peer pressure — many students find it difficult to swim against the current of peer opinion. When discussing sex, for example, students want to avoid being seen as either too prudish or too perverted. Sometimes students have views that fall outside the range of perceived acceptability but they refuse to voice them for fear of social disapproval. Other times, it doesn’t even occur them to consider anything outside the norm. In both cases, peer pressure can undermine full consideration of the issues.

(3) Self-interest — shifts in moral position require changes in our behavior. For example, “buying into” arguments for animal rights might demand that we change our eating habits. Often, it is easy to discount these arguments, not because they lack merit, but because we do not want to make the lifestyle changes that might be required if we became convinced by the argument.

(4) “Afraid of looking in the mirror” — discussions of moral issues can reveal uncomfortable truths about ourselves. Discussions of racial and gender discrimination, for example, can make us uncomfortable when we realize that we (or those we love) have attitudes and behaviors are insensitive and even hurtful.

(5) Ripple effects — because moral issues are interrelated, modifying our view on one issue can send ripple effects through our entire conceptual system.  For example, a discussion of euthanasia might lead us to the conclusion the quality life is important and even that some lives are no longer worth living (e.g., extreme pain without the prospect of relief). If true, then we might come to believe that it be better if some people were never born (e.g., extreme pain without the prospect of relief). Thus, thinking carefully about euthanasia might change our view of abortion. Likewise, becoming convinced by arguments for individual freedom in one area (e.g., free speech) can lead us to rethink our views in other areas (e.g., drug legalization, abortion, hate speech). However, if a student senses that a ripple might turn into a tidal wave, they often disengage.

In each case, becoming aware of the sources for our discomfort can help us move beyond a superficial consideration of the issues. In particular, asking a series of metacognitive questions can help uncover whether the discomfort is healthy (e.g., struggle with unfamiliar or difficult material) or unhealthy (e.g., blocked by entrenched beliefs, peer pressure, self-interest, or an inability to look in the mirror).

Questions we might ask our students (or even ourselves):

  • To what extent is my thinking on particular issue being influenced by my firmly held beliefs, the views of my peers, self-interest, a reluctance to take an honest look in the mirror, or concerns about the need revise my entire ethical system?
  • Am I taking the moral issue under consideration seriously? Why or why not?
  • Would I be willing to change my stance if the argument was compelling? Why or why not?
  • Is there something about the view that I cannot bring myself to consider? If so, what?

While awareness of our various blind spots and areas of discomfort will not automatically improve the quality of discussion, it can pave the way for a more meaningful consideration of the issues. As such, metacognitive awareness can facilitate healthy engagement with moral issues.

Reference:

Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Mind and society: The development of higher mental processes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.


Using metacognition to uncover the substructure of moral issues

By John Draeger, SUNY Buffalo State

As a moral philosopher, my introductory courses revolve around various controversial issues (e.g., abortion, euthanasia, hate speech, same sex marriage, invasions of privacy in the name of national security or commerce). It is not hard to generate discussion about these topics, but important philosophical issues often to get lost in the mayhem. My students try to keep things straight by focusing on particular bits of content. They hope that a laundry list of terms and distinctions will help them make sense of particular ethical issues. For my part, however, most of the interesting stuff occurs behind the scenes. I don’t much care about which topics we discuss because at some level I don’t think that we are talking about the particular topical issues anyway. Details matter, of course, but I am most interested in helping students uncover the underlying value conflicts common to many ethical debates. This, I argue, requires developing metacognitive awareness.

Consider three possible positions on hate speech: (1) ban hate speech on college campuses because it harms individual students, (2) allow hate speech because banning it would violate the rights of individual students, (3) allow hate speech because banning it would do more harm than good in the long-run. Now consider three possible views on governmental surveillance in the name of national security: (1) allow governmental surveillance because it promotes an important good (e.g., national security), (2) ban governmental surveillance because it violates the rights of citizens (e.g., privacy), (3) ban governmental surveillance because it does more harm than good in the long-run. Note the similar underlying value structures of these positions. One favors well-being (e.g., protect individual students or a nation) over other considerations. Another favors rights (e.g., free-speech or privacy) over harms to well-being caused by the exercise of those rights. The last considers two forms of well-being (e.g., short-term and long-term).

As an instructor, I know that teaching students a process by which they can uncover underlying value structures requires scaffolding and plenty of opportunities to practice (Duron, Limback, & Waugh, 2006). Among my many activities and assignments, I ask students to answer the following questions about each of the readings: (1) what is the author’s core insight/thesis? (2) what are the core values at issue? (3) what are the central philosophical problems at issue? (4) what are the central topics at issue? It is not long before students understand that the last two questions are not actually redundant (e.g., well-being versus rights is not the same as hate speech versus governmental surveillance).

This exercise helps students focus on what I take to be most important, namely the underlying value structure. It also sets up the next exercise in which I ask students to use the resources found in one reading (e.g., hate speech) to answer the topical question raised in another (e.g., government surveillance).  This can be difficult until students recognize there are values common across different topical debates and they recognize the similarities in the philosophical substructure (e.g., well-being over rights, rights over well-being, long-term well-being over short-term well-being). Because it isn’t always easy to fit one view into the structure of another, this exercise leads to many questions about each of the readings. As the semester moves along, we discuss each reading in relation to those that came before.  By the end of the semester, we pick author names “at random” and discuss the connections between them.

With an understanding the underlying value structure of a particular moral issue, students can begin to “think like a philosopher.” It puts them in a position to move beyond mere coffee shop conversation and the rehash of media pundit drivel towards a more careful consideration of the issues. Through the process outlined above, they begin to notice when their discussions lapse into media drivel and thus when they need steer the conversation back towards the underlying value structure. Insofar as this exercise moves students towards the ability to consciously and explicitly understand the substructure of values underlying a wide variety of ethical issues, it moves them towards a more sophisticated understanding of those issues and towards a metacognitive awareness of their own learning.

References

Duron, R., Limbach, B., & Waugh, W. (2006). “Critical Thinking Framework for Any Discipline.” International Journal of Teaching and Learning in Higher Education, 17 (2), 160-166.

 


What do we mean when we say “Improve with metacognition”? (Part Two)

by John Draeger (SUNY Buffalo State) and Lauren Scharff (U.S. Air Force Academy*)

The nature and many benefits of metacognition might seem obvious to those of us working in the field. But because our casual conversations had revealed some “fuzziness” in how the term was interpreted, we asked a convenience sample at our institutions (30 faculty and 11 students) what they believe the term ‘metacognition’ means and why it might be important. As summarized in Part I of this two-part exploration, most respondents offered “thinking about thinking” as a rough shorthand for the meaning of metacognitive processes. Beyond that general response, many faculty offered refinements that we grouped into the categories of awareness, intentionality and understanding. While that conversation is ongoing, this week’s post will focus on responses to the second question in our “survey”, “why might it be important for students and instructors to know about metacognition and perhaps incorporate it in their classes?”

When considering the benefits, the majority of our respondents affirmed importance of metacognition in academic settings. In particular, metacognition was reported to be beneficial because it “improves student learning” and “improves teaching.” As in our last post, where we argued that, while defining ‘metacognition’ as “thinking about thinking” can be a helpful way to get the conversation started but is too simplistic, the goal in this post also is to move toward more useful refinements.

Refinements to “improved student learning” can be grouped into two categories:

(1)  Metacognition improves student learning by increasing efficiency and prompting students to  take ownership of their own learning

  • “As a student, if you can understand how you think and learn, then you can more easily choose the method that will work for you.”
  •  Metacognition can “help [students] create strategies to enhance their study of new concepts to increase their retention of the concepts.”
  •  “I can study faster and more efficiently …”
  •  “Metacognition forces students to take positive control of their own development. Much like the first step to getting your finances in order is to see where your money is going, metacognitive questions help a learner assess whether s/he has actually increased his/her level of understanding or knowledge.”
  • “…they [learners] become more independent in their learning…”

(2)  Metacognition increases the depth of learning engagement with material and supports critical thinking

  • “By reflecting on our understanding we’re more likely to improve that understanding and make connections between bodies of knowledge.”
  • “…figuring out why the wrong answers (and the reasoning behind them) are wrong.  This is often more important than getting the right answer.  It is by repairing errors in our thinking that we learn surprising things we didn’t know we were ignorant about…”
  • “[Metacognition is] an important step in the critical thinking process. If I am not aware of how I am thinking about something, the context, the role and the perspective, then it is difficult to think critically”
  • “The issue is being able to use critical-thinking skills to sift through the mass of information to develop appropriate conclusions, theses, etc.  Metacognition enables us to analyze how we’re doing this and thus, do it better.”
  • “If we can get students to think about thinking, their own and others, it will help them to be better thinkers.  It might also encourage them to be more slow, careful and deliberate in their thinking / writing / speaking.”

 

Refinements to “improves teaching” can be grouped into two categories:

(1)  The more instructors understand about their students’ learning processes and are aware of their state of learning, the more then they can adapt to the needs of their students.

  • “I also have to be able to teach in different ways for people who learn differently than me, and have an idea how they learn”
  • “…helps us [instructors] structure our teaching to best support student learning”
  • “It’s important as instructors because if we understand how our cadets [students] think, we can tweak our teaching methods appropriately. “
  • “Because the more aware that students and teachers are about how each other thinks and learns, the more effective classroom learning techniques can be.”

(2)  The more instructors communicate about metacognition, the better they can help students become better learners.

  • “…if professors and students communicate about metacognition it can allow the instructors to use every resource available to them to better convey information to the students.”
  • “…It’s one thing to be aware of how you learn something or think through complex issues.  However, even better is to have the ability to identify which processes are most effective for you.  Metacognition becomes important when it informs us about how to improve, how to be more efficient, and how to “sift the wheat from the chaff,” so to speak… This self-awareness is not always obvious to a student and thus is most likely enhanced when facilitated by faculty members…”

In conclusion, both teaching and learning are dynamic processes that interact with each other.  Thus, we must continue to adapt to the ever-changing circumstances of our current students’ state of learning and help them do so also. Because instructors are not ever-present in students’ lives, our ultimate goal as instructors should be to help develop independent learners.

Metacognition can play a crucial role in both teaching and learning because it prompts us to be “tuned into” these dynamic processes and because it reminds us to be on the lookout for ways to improve and promote deep, life-long learning. These goals are especially important given recently reported shortcomings in higher-education  (e.g. Arum & Roksa, 2011).  Students need to know how to think critically and communicate well. The term ‘metacognition’ can be understood in a variety of ways and there are many benefits to metacognition. However, they boil down to supporting deep learning goals (beyond mere memorization) and critical thinking at a time when students in higher-education need it most.

References:

Arum, R., & Roksa, J. (2011). Academically adrift: Limited learning on college campuses. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

* Disclaimer: The views expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U. S. Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U. S. Govt.


Cultivating a habit of constructive discomfort

by John Draeger, SUNY Buffalo State

As both a gym rat and an academic, I often think about the parallels between physical exercise and intellectual engagement. Both depend on individual ability and personal circumstances. Both can be done in variety of ways and for a variety of reasons. Both require consistent practice and good habits. Both require metacognitive awareness of particular strategies and the likelihood that they will lead to progress towards goals. And because the process is dynamic, we need to cultivate continued awareness of our strategies for physical and intellectual engagement.

Further, I submit that both physical exercise and intellectual engagement require cultivating a habit of constructive discomfort.  It isn’t easy to push our bodies and minds, but maintaining physical and intellectual growth requires it. Unlike the discomfort that comes from putting off an entire week’s worth of exercise until Saturday or waiting until the night before to begin writing a paper, the benefits of constructive discomfort are derived from consistently pushing ourselves in a way that facilitates progress towards our goals.

Related to this notion of constructive discomfort, Vygotsky (1978) argues that learning is most effective within the “zone of proximal development.” It is the space slightly beyond a learner’s current knowledge base and skill level, but a place where learning is still within a person’s reach. It is aspirational without being discouraging. It is challenging without setting someone up for failure.  In the case of exercise, my long-term goal might be to run a marathon. Given my perceived level of fitness, I should probably start with a “couch to 5k” and move up to a marathon later. It is possible that I am in better shape than I think and I can push myself beyond the 5k now. By consciously attending to my state of health and progress towards my long-term goals, I can make micro-adjustments that keep me in the zone of constructive discomfort and headed in the right direction. Instructors can make similar micro-adjustments in the classroom as they gauge the level of student ability. Again, metacognitive awareness of student understanding and progress towards well-articulated goals is essential to identifying the best strategies for a given group of students. Much like a “couch to 5k” program, assignment scaffolding in the classroom can maintain an appropriate level of constructive discomfort and guide students through the zone of proximal development (Wass, Harland, and Mercer, 2011). As students become more aware of their own learning processes, they can learn to make their own micro-adjustments. If, for example, they find themselves bored by some particular piece of classroom content, then they might ask themselves whether it is because they are not being challenged (much like  runners capable of doing more than a 5k) or because they are overwhelmed (much like runners who start out strong only to “over train” and lag behind their goals). As a scholar seated at my writing table, I often find myself asking these sorts of questions about my writing process and making micro-adjustments to keep me in the zone of constructive discomfort and heading towards my goals.

A person can be uncomfortable in a multitude of ways and there is little to be gained by discomfort for the sake of discomfort. If, however, constructive discomfort can contribute to physical and intellectual growth, then we should strive for it. Because knowing whether some particular instance of discomfort is constructive requires a metacognitive awareness of our individual circumstances and individual goals, we should cultivate a habit of metacognitive awareness for our learning, fitness, or any other skill we hope to develop.


References:

Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Mind and society: The development of higher mental processes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Wass, R., Harland, T., and Mercer, A. (2011). “Scaffolding critical thinking in the zone of Proximal development.” Higher Education Research and Development, 30 (3), 317-328.

 


A Brief History of Learning Inventories

Noel Entwistle and Velda McCune (2004) catalog the evolution of learning inventories over the last fifty years. The article is particularly useful in highlighting the ways similar ideas are discussed using differing terminology. Because of the article’s scope, readers can become quickly familiar with broad trends.

Entwistle, N., & McCune, V. (2004). The conceptual bases of study strategy inventories. Educational Psychology Review, 16(4), 325-345.


Self-regulation and metacognitive judgments among psychology students

Randy Isaacson and Frank Fujita (2006) consider the effects of metacognitive judgments on anticipated performance, self-efficacy, and learning satisfaction in introductory psychology students. Of note, the study allowed students to choose test questions based on their self-assessment of the comprehension of the material.

Isaacson, R. M., & Fujita, F. (2006). Metacognitive Knowledge Monitoring and Self-Regulated Learning: Academic Success and Reflections on Learning. Journal of Scholarship of Teaching and Learning, 6(1), 39-55.


The Value of Integrative Learning

http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED486247.pdf

Mary Huber and Pat Hutchings (2004) consider the value of integrative learning (e.g., to becoming a more motivated learner, a more nimble employee, a more responsible citizen, an educated person) and the role metacognition can play in making learning more integrative. They write, “Reflection. Metacognition. Learning how to learn. Whatever the language or lineage, the idea of making students more self-aware and purposeful –more intentional –about their studies is a powerful one, and it is key to fostering integrative learning. Assisting students to develop such capacities poses important challenges for campus reforms around teaching and learning” (7).

Huber, M. T., & Hutchings, P. (2004). Integrative Learning: Mapping the Terrain. The Academy in Transition. Association of American Colleges and Universities.