Month: April 2020

Critically Thinking about our Not-So-Critical Thinking in the Social World

By Randi Shedlosky-Shoemaker and Carla G. Strassle, York College of Pennsylvania

When people fail to engage in critical thinking while navigating their social world, they inevitably create hurdles that disrupt their cultural awareness and competence. Unfortunately, people generally struggle to see the hurdles that they construct (i.e., bias blind spot; Pronin, Lin, & Ross, 2002). We propose metacognition can be used to help people understand the process by which they think about and interact with others.

a photo montage of face images from a large variety of people

The first step is to reflect on existing beliefs about social groups, which requires people to examine the common errors in critical thinking that they may be engaging in. By analyzing those errors, people can begin to take down the invisible hurdles on the path to cultural awareness and competency. Using metacognition principles collected by Levy (2010), in this post we discuss how common critical thinking failures affect how people define and evaluate social groups, as well as preserve the resulting assumptions. More importantly, we provide suggestions on avoiding those failures.

Defining Social Groups

Social categories, by their very nature, are social constructs. That means that people should not think of social categories in terms of accuracy, but rather utility (Levy, 2010, pp. 11-12). For example, knowing a friend’s sexual orientation might help one consider what romantic partners their friend might be interested in. When people forget that dividing the world into social groups is not about accurately representing others but rather a mechanism to facilitate social processes, they engage in an error known as reification. In relation to social groups, this error can also involve using tangible, biological factors (e.g., genetics) as the root cause of social constructs (e.g., race, gender). To avoid this reification error, people should view biological and psychological variables as two separate, but complementary levels of description (Levy, 2010, pp. 15-19), and remember that social categories are only important if they are useful.

Beyond an inappropriate reliance on biological differences to justify the borders between social groups, people often oversimplify those groups. Social categories are person-related variables, which are best represented on a continuum; reducing those variables to discrete, mutually exclusive groups, creates false dichotomies (Levy, 2010, pp. 26-28). False dichotomies, such as male or female, make it easier to overlook both commonalities shared by individuals across different groups as well as differences that exist between members within the same group.

Overly simplistic dichotomies also support the assumption that two groups represent the other’s polar opposite (e.g., male is the polar opposite of female, Black is the polar opposite of White). Such an assumption means ignoring that individuals can be a member of two supposedly opposite groups (e.g., identify as multiple races/ethnicities) or neither group (e.g., identify as agender).

Here, metacognition promotes reflection on the criteria used for defining group memberships. In that reflection, people should consider whether the borders that they apply to groups are too constraining, leading them to misrepresent individuals with whom they interact. Additionally, people should consider ways in which seemingly different groups can have shared features, while also still maintaining some degree of uniqueness (i.e., similarity-uniqueness paradox, Levy, 2010, pp. 39-41). By appreciating the nature and limitations of the categorization process, people can reflect upon whether applications of group memberships are meaningful or not.

Evaluating Social Groups

Critical thinking failures that occur when defining social categories are compounded when people move from describing social groups into evaluating those social groups (i.e., evaluative bias of language, Levy, 2010, pp. 4-7). In labeling social others, people often speak to what they have learned to see as different. As more dominant groups retain the power to set the standards, people may learn to use the dominant groups as the default (i.e., cultural imperialism; Young, 1990). For example, when people describe others as “that older woman”… “that kid”… “that blind person”… and so on – their chosen label conveys what they see as divergent from the status quo. By becoming more aware of the language they use, people simultaneously become more aware of how they think about social others based on social grouping. In monitoring and reflecting on language, metacognition affords us a valuable opportunity to adapt thinking through language.

Changing language can be challenging, however, particularly when people find themselves in environments that lack diversity. Frequently, people find themselves surrounded by others who look, think, and act like them. When surrounded by others who largely represent one’s self, unreflective attempts to make sense of the world may naturally echo their point of view. This is problematic for two reasons: first, people tend to rely more on readily available information in decision-making and judgments (i.e., availability heuristic, Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).

Further, with one’s own views reflected back at them, people easily overestimate how common their beliefs and behaviors are (i.e., false consensus effect, Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). That inaccurate assessment of “common” can lead people to conclude that such beliefs and behaviors are also “good”. Conversely, what is seen as different or uncommon, relative to the self, becomes “bad” (i.e., naturalistic fallacy, Levy, 2010, pp. 50-51).

By pausing to assess the variability of perspectives people have access to, metacognition allows people to consider what perspectives they are missing. In that way, people can more intentionally seek out ideas and experiences that may be different from their own.

Preserving Assumptions

Though not easy, breaking away from one’s point of view and seeking out diverse perspectives can also address another hurdle that people create for themselves: specifically, the tendency to preserve one’s existing assumptions (i.e., belief perseverance phenomenon; e.g., Ross & Anderson, 1982). Change takes work, and not surprisingly, people often choose the path of least resistance – that is, to make new information fit into the system we already have (i.e., assimilation bias, Levy, 2010, pp. 154-156).

Further, people tend to seek out information that supports existing beliefs while disregarding or discounting disconfirming information (i.e., confirmation bias, Levy, 2010, pp. 164-165). Given the habit of sticking to what fits with existing beliefs, people develop an illusion of consensus. Existing beliefs are reinforced when people fail to realize that such beliefs inadvertently influence behaviors, which in turn shape interaction, thereby creating situations that further support, rather than challenge, existing belief systems (i.e., self-fulfilling prophecy, e.g., Wilkins, 1976).

This tendency then, to protect what one already “knows” speaks to the necessity of metacognition to challenge one’s existing belief system. When people analyze and question their existing beliefs they can begin to recognize where revision of those existing beliefs is needed and choose to acquire new perspectives to do so.

Summary

So many of the critical thinking failures above occur without much effortful or conscious awareness on our part. Engaging in metacognition, and non-defensively addressing the unintentional errors one makes, allows people to break down common hurdles that disrupt cultural awareness and competency. It’s when people critically reflect upon their thought processes, identifying the potential errors that may have shaped their existing perspectives, that they can begin to change how they think and feel about social others. In terms of developing a heightened sense of cultural awareness and competency, metacognition then helps us all realize that the world is a much more complex though interesting place.

References

Levy, D.A. (2010). Tools of critical thinking: Metathoughts for psychology. Waveland Press.

Pronin, E., Lin, D. Y., & Ross, L. (2002). The bias blind spot: Perceptions of bias in self versus others. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28, 369-381. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167202286008

Ross. L., & Anderson, C. (1982). Shortcomings in the attribution process: On the origins and maintenance of erroneous social assessments. In D. Kahneman, P. Siovic, & A. Tversky (Eds.), Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Cambridge Univ. Press.

Ross, L., Greene, D., & House, P. (1977).The “false consensus effect”: An egocentric bias in social perception and attribution processes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 13, 279-301. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1031(77)90049-X

Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 27, 1124-1131. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.185.4157.1124

Wilkins, W. E. (1976). The concept of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Sociology of Education, 49, 175–183. https://doi.org/10.2307/2112523

Young, I. (1990). Justice and the politics of difference. Princeton University Press.


Pandemic Metacognition: Distance Learning in a Crisis

By Jennifer A. McCabe, Ph.D., Center for Psychology, Goucher College

The college “classroom” certainly looks different these days. Due to campus closures in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, we no longer travel to a common space to learn together in physical proximity. Though most of us have transitioned to online instruction, there was insufficient time to prepare for this new model – instead, we are in the midst of “emergency distance learning,” with significant implications for teacher and student metacognition.

image of person at computer under emergency red light

New Demands for Self-regulation

Now that certain overt motivators are no longer present, self-regulated learning is more critical than ever (e.g., Sperling et al., 2004; Wolters, 2003). Students are no longer required to hand in work during class, to engage in in-person class discussions about learned material, or to come face-to-face with instructors who know whether students are keeping up with the course. Instead they must figure out how to engage in the work of learning (and to know it is, indeed, still supposed to be work), away from the nearby guidance of instructors, other on-campus support sources, and peers. What are the effects of isolation on student metacognition? We can only find out as the situation evolves, and it will surely prove to be a complex picture. Though some will continue to succeed and even find new sources of motivation and revised strategies during this unusual time, others may experience a decline in metacognitive accuracy in the absence of typically available sources of explicit and implicit feedback on learning.

What metacognitive and motivational challenges face students who began the semester in a traditional in-person classroom, and now log in to a device to “go to class?” When I invited my (now online) students to report their experiences in preparing for our first web-based exam, many reported that the learning strategies themselves do not feel different as implemented at home, but that they are especially struggling with motivation and time management. Though these are common issues for college students even in the best of (face-to-face) circumstances, it seems they may be magnified by the current situation. For example, distractions look very different at home. Even if students already had figured out a system to manage distractions, and to channel their motivation to find focused time to implement effective learning strategies, this campus-based skill set may not translate to their current settings. Students need to recognize barriers to learning in this new context, and should be supported in developing (perhaps new or at least tweaked) strategies for academic success.

Regarding time management, online course deadlines may be timed differently – perhaps more flexibly or perhaps not – on different days of the week (instead of in a class meeting), late at night (or early in the morning), or over the weekend. Students must strategically allocate their time in a manner different from traditional classroom learning. This is compounded by the fact that some courses meet synchronously, some are completely asynchronous, and some are a hybrid. Managing this new schedule requires the metacognitive skill of recognizing how long different types of learning will take, applying the appropriate strategies, and – oh yes – fitting all that in with other non-academic demands that may change day to day. Planning is especially challenging – and anxiety-provoking – with so much unknown about the future.

Stretched Too Thin to Think Well

Looming over the learning, we cannot forget, is the actual threat of the virus, and the myriad ways it is impacting students’ mental and physical health. In my cognition classes, we discuss the implications of cognitive load, or the amount of our limited attentional resources (and therefore working memory capacity) being used for various tasks in a given moment; this current load determines how much is left over for tasks central to learning and performance goals (e.g., Pass et al., 2003). If working memory is consumed with concerns about one’s own health or the health of loved ones, financial concerns, caregiving needs, food availability, or even basic safety, it is no surprise that the ability to focus on coursework would be compromised. Intrusive worries or negative thoughts may be particularly troublesome right now, and again leave fewer resources available for learning new information. Instructors may want to consider evidence-based educational interventions – such as writing about worries to manage anxiety – that have been effective in clearing ‘space’ in mental load for learning tasks (Ramirez & Beilock, 2011).

Most importantly, we all need to understand (and accept) the limitations of our cognitive system, the implications of having limited attentional resources, and how to most effectively manage this shifting load. To better support students in metacognitive awareness, instructors across disciplines can incorporate information about cognitive load management and self-regulated learning strategies as part of their courses.

Teachers should also think carefully about the line between desirable difficulties – those learning conditions that are challenging, slow, and error-prone, but lead to stronger long-term retention – and undesirable difficulties – those challenges that are simply hard but do not result in better learning (e.g., Yan et al., 2017). When faced with a choice to add work or effort, consider whether it is part of the learning that relates to the core learning outcomes for the class. If it does not, given the current uniquely high-load circumstances we find ourselves in, drop it.

Further, be explicit and transparent with students about why assignments were retained or changed (ideally connecting these to those core objectives), and share with them your thought process about course-related design and assessment decisions. Most of all, communicate early and often with students about expectations and assessments to help them with motivation, scheduling, and cognitive load. Acknowledge that this is a highly atypical situation, show compassion, allow flexibility as you can, and let them know we are all learning together.

Imperative Explicitness

Metacognition in the time of COVID-19 must be even more intentionally brought from the implicit “hidden curriculum” of college to the explicit. Factors important to student metacognition, including self-regulated learning, should be named as a skill set central to academic (and life) success. Help them better understand their own learning and memory processes, and how strategies may need to evolve in changing circumstances, which for now means “emergency distance learning.” Perhaps a silver lining is that this investment in metacognitive flexibility will pay off in supporting students’ future endeavors. For teachers, this unexpected transition just might help us improve our student-centered approaches – wherever our classrooms may exist in the future.

Suggested References

Pass, F., Renkl, A., & Sweller, J. (2003). Cognitive load theory and instructional design: Recent developments. Educational Psychologist, 38(1), 1-4. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15326985EP3801_1

Ramirez, G., & Beilock, S. L. (2011). Writing about testing worries boosts exam performance in the classroom. Science, 331(6014), 211-213. https://doi.org/ 10.1126/science.1199427

Sperling, R. A., Howard, B. C., Staley, R., & DuBois, N. (2004). Metacognition and self-regulated learning constructs. Educational Research and Evaluation, 10(2), 117–139. doi:10.1076/edre.10.2.117.27905

Wolters, C. A. (2003). Regulation of motivation: Evaluating an underemphasized aspect of self-regulated learning. Educational Psychologist, 38(4), 189–205. doi:10.1207/S15326985EP3804_1

Yan, V. X., Clark, C. M., & Bjork, R. A. (2017). Memory and metamemory considerations in the instruction of human beings revisited: Implications for optimizing online learning. In J. C. Horvath, J. Lodge, & J. A. C. Hattie (Eds.), From the Laboratory to the Classroom: Translating the Learning Sciences for Teachers (pp. 61-78). Routledge.


Fractals and Teaching Philosophies (Part 2): Some Reflection on the Value of Metacognition

by Dr. Ed Nuhfer, California State Universities (retired)

Our previous blog contribution introduced the nature of fractals and explained why the products of intellectual development have fractal qualities. Our brain neurology is fractal, so fractal qualities saturate the entire process of intellectual development. Read the previous blog now, to refresh any needed awareness.

The acts of drafting and using a written philosophy are metacognitive by design. Rare use of philosophies seems symptomatic of undervaluing metacognition. When we operate from a written philosophy, each day offers a practice of metacognition through asking: “Did I practice my philosophy?” That involves considering where we might not have exercised one of the fractal generator’s six components (Figure 1) and then resolve to do so at the next opportunity. Doing so instills the habits of mind needed to do what we intended. Such metacognitive practice is very different from engaging challenges as separately packaged events, without using the “thinking about thinking” needed to understand how our practice was consistent with what we wanted to do. In teaching, we find some of our most significant difficulties appear when we find ourselves doing the opposite of what we most wanted to do. We get into those difficulties by not being aware of the decisions that brought us there.

One possible application of metacognition lies in a large-scale challenge that affects all schools – the annual evaluation of faculty for retention and promotion often reveals chronic problems. How might the standard practices faculty typically experience differ from a practice in which faculty employed written teaching philosophies as a way to address this annual challenge?

WHY Do We Do Annual Review of Faculty?

A metacognitive approach would start with a reflection of the reasons WHY schools go through the prickly annual ritual of evaluating faculty and the outcomes that they hope to attain from doing it. A recent discussion on a faculty development listserv showed that almost no institutions have satisfying answers to “WHY?” For many, an unreflective approach to annual review commonly defaulted to ranking the faculty according to their scores from student ratings forms, sometimes from just one global item on the forms. Asking “WHY?” resulted in the following personal email from an accomplished faculty member: “The main rationale seems in practice often to be simply ‘We have to determine annual merit scores to determine salary increases, and so we have to generate a merit score for teaching (and for research and for service).’”

Given such an annual review process, the faculty will focus on becoming “better teachers” by focusing on raising their student ratings scores, but is that the primary outcome that institutions want? Would we write that “to obtain high student ratings” as a reason that we teach in our teaching philosophies? If we sincerely want effective teaching and student learning, is there a better answer to “WHY?”

Employing Written Philosophies – An Alternate Approach

More specifically, consider which outcome of the following you would choose to expend efforts for yourself or your colleagues: 1) to try to achieve higher student ratings or 2) to improve their mastery of some things labeled in Figure 1 that are known to increase student learning? For example, if a faculty member chose for one year to produce better learning by expanding his knowledge of pedagogy to permit the matching of different kinds of instruction to specific types of content, could that be preferable? Suppose another faculty member discovered that particular stages of adult thinking existed. What if she aspired in the coming year to gain an understanding of this literature, and she focused in the coming year on designing some lessons that helped students to discover the level of thinking they had reached and what their next higher stage might be? Might that be preferable to trying to achieve higher ratings?

Illustration of components (thinking, teaching, learning) in the fractal generator for faculty and students (by Ed Nuhfer)

Figure 1. We repeat the graphic from Part 1, Figure 2 here. This representation of a philosophy as a fractal generator is somewhat analogous to a stem cell in that it contains all the essential components to produce whatever we need. Metacognition allows us to identify something of value to our current practice. Then for a year, we articulate a philosophy that includes a focus to develop that area.

When we begin to be metacognitive concerning WHY we should want to do annual evaluations and how we should use student input, things should emerge that differ from merely sorting faculty into categories in order to dispense rewards and penalties. Some positive outcomes might be enhancing awareness of how we could design our annual evaluations to help make our institutions more fit places in which to teach and learn, or to provide our graduates with better capacity for life-long learning. In such cases, the nature of annual review changes from an inspection of each faculty member’s popularity with her or his students at the end of their courses into a metacognitive process designed to produce valued outcomes. Management expert Edwards Deming warned particularly about trying to “inspect in” quality at the end of an event or process. Deming’s 14 principles can be condensed into just one concept: “Be metacognitive.” Remain aware of what you most wanted to do when you take any actions to do it.

Changing the Annual Review Format: Embed Metacognition

“Be metacognitive” represents a significant change in most institutional thinking. So, how might we enact this change? One approach would be to design the annual review more like a self-directed contract for practice. Faculty write the philosophies that they intend to practice. A graphic generator like Figure 1 can assist understanding what one now does lots of and too little of. They pick a specific area that they want to do more of and articulate their intent to develop some additional strength in that area. They also articulate WHY they chose this emphasis and what outcome they seek to achieve.

When faculty start their term, they share with their students the emphasis and the outcome through the written syllabus of each class. During the semester, their practice now achieves a metacognitive quality. They regularly reflect on their practice and monitor themselves on whether they are practicing as intended. Their annual review of teaching then becomes a report with parts somewhat like the following. 

  • Did they practice their stated philosophy? 
  • How did their students respond?
  • How did their practice change, and did that contribute to revisions in their philosophy?
  • What is their written contractual plan and philosophy for the coming year?

Weighing the Alternatives

Of the two models of annual evaluations shared above, over-reliance on student ratings for faculty evaluation answers the WHY question with: “We maintain universities so that students can rate the faculty and so that faculty will strive to be rewarded for higher ratings.” Such absurdities arise whenever we practice with no better answers to “WHY?”

As a final thought, consider how an end-of-the-course grade for a student is analogous to annual evaluation for a faculty member. How might teaching students to write their learning philosophies improve their design for learning?