Month: April 2015

So Your Students Think They Are Left-Brained Thinkers or Kinesthetic Learners: Please God, No! How Metacognition Can Explain Student’s Misconceptions

By Aaron S. Richmond, Hannah M. Rauer, and Eric Klein

Metropolitan State University of Denver

Have you heard students say, “We only use 10% of our brain!” or “MMR shots cause Autism” or “My cousin has ESP…no seriously!” or “I am really good at multi-tasking.” or “I have high bodily-kinesthetic intelligence!”? Sadly, the list can go on, and on, and on. Our students, and the general public for that matter, have many misconceptions and preformed inaccurate naïve theories of the world which often impairs learning in the classroom (Dochy et al., 1999). These misconceptions are pervasive and extremely hard to change (Lilienfeld et al., 2009). Our research suggests that metacognition may be the key to understanding misconceptions.

My undergraduate students and I sought to understand the role metacognition could play in the susceptibility to common psychology and education misconceptions. Prior to our study, most research in this area focused on the persistence of misconceptions (e.g., Kowalski & Taylor, 2009), or how they relate to critical thinking skills (Taylor & Kowalski, 2004), or how to reduce misconceptions by direct instruction (e.g., Glass et al., 2008). However, our study was the first to investigate how metacognitive beliefs (e.g., metacognitive awareness, need for cognition, cognitive and learning strategy use, or actual metacognitive performance) may predict prevalence of psychological and educational misconceptions.

We gave over 300 undergraduate freshman a 65-item psychological and educational misconceptions inventory that were pooled from several studies (e.g., Amsel et al., 2009; Standing & Huber, 2003). We assessed metacognitive beliefs using the Need for Cognition Scale (NCS; Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996), the Memory for Self-Efficacy Questionnaire (MSEQ; Berry, West, & Dennehy, 1989), the Metacognitive Awareness Inventory (MAI; Schraw & Dennison, 1994), the Motivated Strategies for Learning Questionnaire (MSLQ; Pintrich, Smith, Garcia, & McKeachie, 1991), and one direct measure of metacognition, calibration. Calibration is the degree to which learners understand what they know and what they do not know.

We found that metacognitive variables were highly predictive of student’s susceptibility to believing in educational and psychological misconceptions. Interestingly, the most powerful predictor was the student’s actual measure of metacognition (e.g., calibration as measured through gamma). Meaning, the more accurate students were at knowing when they knew or did not know something (i.e., calibration), the less they believed in misconceptions. Also, when students had higher scores on need for cognition, had more advanced beliefs on how to regulate cognition, stronger self-efficacy for learning preferences and control of learning beliefs, the less susceptible they were to believing in misconceptions.

What does this research tell us? We think that this is the first step in understanding the role metacognition has in conceptual development (both inaccurate and accurate). Second, if teachers stress the importance of metacognitive development and teach how to improve student metacognition, then one of the added benefits maybe that students will have more accurate conceptual development. The natural progression in this research is to experimentally manipulate metacognitive instruction and see if it reduces educational and psychological misconceptions.

References

Amsel, E., Johnston, A., Alvarado, E., Kettering, J., Rankin, L., & Ward, M. (2009). The effect of perspective on misconceptions in psychology: A test of conceptual change theory. Journal of Instructional Psychology, 36(4), 289-295.

Berry, J. M., West, R. L. & Dennehey, D. M. (1989). Reliability and validity of the Memory Self-Efficacy Questionnaire. Developmental Psychology, 25(5), 701-713. doi:10.1037/0012-1649.25.5.701

Kowalski, P., & Taylor, A. K. (2009). The effect of refuting misconceptions in the introductory psychology class. Teaching of Psychology, 36(3), 153-159. doi:10.1080/00986280902959986

Pintrich, P. R., Smith. D. A., Garcia, T., & McKeachie. W. (1991) A manual for the use of the motivated strategies for learning questionnaire. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan.

Schraw, G., & Dennison, R. S. (1994). Assessing metacognitive awareness. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 19(4), 460-475. doi:10.1006/ceps.1994.1033

Standing, L. G., & Huber, H. (2003). Do psychology courses reduce beliefs in psychological myths? Social Behavior & Personality: An International Journal, 31(6), 585-585. doi:10.2224/sbp.2003.31.6.585

Taylor, A. K., & Kowalski, P. (2004). Naïve psychological science: The prevalence, strength, and sources of misconceptions. The Psychological Record, 54(1), 15-25.


Exploring the relationship between awareness, self-regulation, and metacognition

Thinking about thinking, awareness, and self-regulation Share on Xby John Draeger (SUNY Buffalo State)

Recent blog posts have considered the nature of metacognition and metacognitive instruction. Lauren Scharff, for example, defines metacognition as “the intentional and ongoing interaction between awareness and self-regulation” (Scharff, 2015). This post explores the relationship between the elements of this definition.

Scharff observes that a person can recognize that a pedagogical strategy isn’t working without changing her behavior (e.g., someone doesn’t change because she is unaware of alternative strategies) and a person can change her behavior without monitoring its efficacy (e.g., someone tries a technique that she heard about in a workshop without thinking through whether the technique makes sense within a particular learning environment). Scharff argues that a person engaging in metacognition will change her behavior when she recognizes that a change is needed. She will be intentional about when and how to make that change. And she will continue the new behavior only if there’s reason to believe that it is the achieving the desired result. Metacognition, therefore, can be found in the interaction between awareness and self-regulated action. Moreover, because learning environments are fluid, the interaction between awareness and self-regulation must be ongoing. This suggests that awareness and self-regulation are necessary for metacognition.

In response, I offered what might seem to be a contrary view (Draeger, 2015). I argued that the term ‘metacognition’ is vague in two ways. First, it is composed of overlapping sub-elements. Second, each of these sub-elements falls along a continuum. For example, metacognitive instructors can be more (or less) intentional, more (or less) informed about evidence-based practice, more (or less) likely to have alternative strategies ready to hand, and more (or less) nimble with regards to when and how to shift strategies based on their “in the moment” awareness of student need. Sub-elements are neither individually necessary nor jointly sufficient for a full characterization of metacognition. Rather, a practice is metacognitive if it has “enough” of the sub-elements and they are far “enough” along the various continua.

Scharff helpfully suggests that metacognition must involve both awareness and action. I would add that awareness can be divided into sub-elements (e.g., reflection, mindfulness, self-monitoring, self-knowledge) and behavior can be divided into sub-elements (e.g., self-regulation, collective actions, institutional mandates). While I suspect that no one of the sub-elements is individually necessary for metacognition, Scharff has correctly identified two broad clusters of elements that are required for metacognition.

As I continue to think through the relationship between awareness and self-regulation, I am reminded of an analogy between physical exercise and intellectual growth. As I have said in a previous post, I am a gym rat. Among other things, I swim several times a week. A few years ago, however, I noticed that my stroke needed refinement. So, I contacted a swimming instructor. She found a handful of areas where I could improve, including my kick and the angle of my arms. As I worked on these items, it was often helpful to focus on my kick without worrying about the angle of my arms and vice versa. With time and effort, I got gradually better. Because my kick had been atrocious, focusing on that one area resulted in dramatic improvement. Because my arm angle hadn’t been all that bad, improvements were far less dramatic. Working on my kick and my arm angle combined to make me a better swimmer. Separating the various elements of my stroke allowed me to identify areas for improvement and allowed me to tackle my problem areas without feeling overwhelmed. However, even after working on the parts, I found that I still needed to put it together. Eventually, I found a swim rhythm that brought elements into alignment.

Likewise, it is often useful to separate elements of our pedagogical practice (e.g., awareness, self-regulation) because separation allows us identify and target areas in need of improvement. If a person knows what she is doing isn’t working but doesn’t know what else to do, then she might focus on identifying alternative strategies. If a person knows of alternative strategies but does not know when or how to use them, then she might focus on her “in the moment awareness” and her ability to shift to new strategies as needed during class. Focusing on the one element can give a person something concrete to work on without feeling overwhelmed by all the other moving parts. The separation is useful, but it is also somewhat artificial. By analogy, my kick and my arm angle are elements of my swim stroke, but they are also part of an interrelated process. While it is important to improve the parts, the ultimate goal is finding a way to integrate the changes into an effective whole. Metacognitive instructors seek to become more explicit, more intentional, more informed about evidence-based practice, and better able to make “in the moment” adjustments. Focusing on each of these elements can improve practice. Separating these elements can be useful, but somewhat artificial because the ultimate goal is finding a way to integrate these elements into an effective whole.

References

Draeger, John (2015). “So what if ‘metacognition’ is vague!” Retrieved from https://www.improvewithmetacognition.com/so-what-if-metacognition-is-vague/

Scharff, Lauren (2015). “What do we mean by ‘metacognitive instruction?” Retrieved from https://www.improvewithmetacognition.com/what-do-we-mean-by-metacognitive-instruction/

 


Metacognition and Specifications Grading: The Odd Couple?

By Linda B. Nilson, Clemson University

More than anything else, metacognition is awareness of what’s going on in one’s mind. This means, first, that a person sizes up a task before beginning it and figures out what kind of a task it is and what strategies to use. Then she monitors her thinking as she progresses through the task, assessing the soundness of her strategies and her success at the end.

So what does this have to do with specs grading?

In specs grading, all assignments and tests are graded pass/fail, credit/no credit, where “pass” means at least B or better work. A student product passes if it conforms to the specifications (specs) that an instructor described in the assignment or test directions. So either the students follow the directions and “get it right,” or the work doesn’t count. Partial credit doesn’t exist.

For the instructor, the main task is laying out the specs. A short reading compliance assignment may have specs as simple as: “You must answer all the study questions, and each answer must be at least 100 words long.” For more substantial assignments, the instructor can detail the “formula” or template of the assignment – that is, the elements and organization of a good literature review, research proposal, press release, or lab report – or provide a list of the questions that she wants students to answer, as for a reflection on a service-learning or group project experience. Especially for formulaic assignments, which so many undergraduate-level assignments are, models and examples bring the specs to life.

The stakes are higher for students than they are in our traditional grading system. With specs grading, it’s all or nothing. No sliding by with a careless, eleventh-hour product because partial credit is a given.

To be successful in a specs-graded course, students have to be aware of their thinking as they complete their assignments and tests. This means that students, first have to pay attention to the directions, and the directions are themselves a learning experience when they explicitly lay out the formula for different types of work. Especially when enhanced with models, the specs supply the crucial information that we so often gloss over: exactly what the task involves. Otherwise, how should our students know? With clear specs, they learn what reflection involves, how a literature review is organized, and what a research proposal must contain. Then during the task, students need to monitor and assess their work to determine if it is indeed meeting the specs. “Does the depth of my response match the length requirement?” “Am I answering all the reflection questions?” “Am I following the proper organization?” “Have I written all the sections?”

Another distinguishing characteristic of specs grading is the replacement of the point system with “bundles” of assignments and tests. For successfully completing a bundle, students obtain final course grades. And they select the bundle and the grade they are willing to work for. To get a D, the bundle involves relatively little, unchallenging work. For higher grades, the bundles require progressively more work, more challenging work, or both. In addition, each bundle is associated with a set of learning outcomes, so a given grade indicates the outcomes a student has achieved.

If students fail to self-monitor and self-assess, they risk receiving no credit for their work and, given that it is part of a bundle, getting a lower grade in the course. And their grade is important for a whole new reason: because they chose the grade they wanted/needed and its accompanying workload. This element of choice and volition increases students’ sense of responsibility for their performance.

With specs grading, students do get limited opportunities to revise an unacceptable piece of work or to obtain get a 24-hour extension on an assignment. These opportunities are represents by virtual tokens that students receive at the beginning of the course. Three is a reasonable number. This way, the instructor doesn’t have to screen excuses, requests for exceptions, and the like. She also has the option of giving students chances to earn tokens and rewarding those with the most tokens at the end of the course.

Specs grading solves many of the problems that our traditional grading system has bred while strengthening students’ metacognition and sense of ownership of their grades. Details on using and transitioning to this grading system are in my 2015 book, Specifications Grading: Restoring Rigor, Motivating Students, and Saving Faculty Time (Sterling, VA: Stylus).