by David Westmoreland, U.S. Air Force Academy*

One of the many challenges for science educators is teaching about topics that are largely resolved in the scientific community, yet remain controversial in broader society.  Such topics often make students uncomfortable, and thus meet with resistance to learning (Johnson and Peeples 1987, Byford et al. 2009). When instructors present such topics as no longer under question, students are likely to perceive the teacher as strongly biased to one side of a controversy that they consider to be ongoing.

This conflict of perception arises partly from a lack of a meaningful understanding of how scientific thinking differs from the broader practices of everyday, social thinking.   I have found that explicit instruction on the difference between scientific and social thinking enables students to be more objective when learning about controversial subjects.  In turn, I am better able to break through socially derived barriers to learning (Clough 1994, Sinclair et al. 1997, Shipman et al. 2002).

I introduce this exercise as a metacognitive lab that attempts to answer the question “How do you know?”  I define metacognition for the students,as the effort to understand one’s own thought processes, in addition to understanding the thought processes used by others.   Students are split into small groups of 3-4 individuals seated to foster within-group discussion while minimizing between-group discussion.  Each group is presented with 4-5 of the “Truth” statements listed below.

Students are asked to proceed through each statement, imagining themselves as a person who takes the statement to be true.  What would that person give as his or her basis for accepting its truth?  From this, students compile on the board a “ways of knowing” list.  A typical list, paired with its corresponding “Truth” statement, is shown below.  It is not important that students identify these exact categories of knowledge.  The point of the exercise is to have students recognize that social thinking incorporates a wide variety of thought processes.

“Truth” statement	Typical “Way of Knowing” categories identified by students
Eggs are fragile.	Personal experience
The nucleus, which occupies the interior of a cell, is smaller than the cell itself.	Logic
Water freezes at 32 degrees F.	AuthorityPersonal experience (often listed, then retracted after students realize they have never personally measured the temperature of freezing water)
Everyone has a moral sense.	Desire for the statement to be trueAuthorityIntuition
I don’t trust him/her.  (Having just met the person.)	Intuition
A higher power is punishing America for its acceptance of sinful lifestyles.	AuthorityDesire for the statement to be trueDirect revelation
If a = b and b + 1 = 5, a = 4.	Logic
There are ten fundamental rules that a higher power instructs us to live by.	Direct revelation (if Moses)Authority (everyone else)
President Obama does not have a valid American birth certificate.	AuthorityRumor mill (no identifiable authority, but so often repeated that the statement becomes accepted as truth)
Crystal therapy can restore harmony and peace of mind by clearing negative energy blocks that we have deep within us.	AuthorityPersonal experienceDesire for the statement to be true

 

In the last part of the exercise, students are asked to strike lines through ways of knowing that are not used in science.   Some ways of knowing are eliminated easily (revelation, desire for a thing to be true, rumor mill), while others require deeper analysis.  For example, intuition is used in science for formulating ideas, but not as a basis for concluding that ideas have scientific validity.  Typically, three ways of knowing are left at the end:  authority, logic, and personal experience.

By comparing the ways of knowing used in social thinking to those used in science, one can see why social controversies often persist when a scientific consensus has been reached.  Social thinking incorporates a wider variety of ways of knowing, and is not necessarily grounded in the three tenets of science (Schafersman 1994):  (a) empiricism, a demand for data that can be independently verified; (b) skepticism, a willingness to abandon established conclusions in light of new information; and (c) rationalism, the principle of noncontradiction.

Having prepared students with an introduction to metacognition, I encounter less resistance when teaching theories of evolution, global warming, and genetic engineering.  Having recognized the fundamental differences between scientific and social thinking, students are better able to accept that different conclusions are likely to result from divergent practices in thinking.

 

Byford, J., Lennon, S., & Russell III, W.B. (2009.)  Teaching controversial issues in the social studies: a research study of high school teachers. The Clearing House 82(4), 165 – 170.

Clough, M. P.  (1994.)  Diminish students’ resistance to biological evolution.  The American Biology. Teacher 56(7), 409 – 415.

Johnson, R. L., & Peeples, E.E.  (1987.)  The role of scientific understanding in college. The American Biology. Teacher 49(2), 93 – 98.

Schafersman, S. D.  (1994.)  An introduction to science: scientific thinking and the scientific method. Available online at: http://www.freeinquiry.com.

Shipman, H. L., Brickhouse, N.W., Dagher, Z. & Letts IV, W.J.  (2002.)  Changes in student views of religion and science in a college astronomy course.  Science Education 86(4), 526 – 547.

Sinclair, A., Pendarvis, M.P., & Baldwin, B.  1997.  The relationship between college zoology students’ beliefs about evolutionary theory and religion.  Journal of Research and Development in Education 39(2), 118 – 125.

 

* Disclaimer: The views expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U. S. Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U. S. Govt.

by Aaron S. Richmond, *Anastasia M. Bacca, *Jared S. Becknell,  *Mary P. Mancuso, *Ryan P. Coyle, and *Eric Klein

Metropolitan State University of Denver

(*) Undergraduate students

Much of the literature regarding metacognition has focused on awareness of metacognitive processes (Antonietti, Ignazi, & Perego, 2000; Metallidou, 2009; Schraw & Dennison, 1994; Topcu & Ubuz, 2008), defining metacognitive skill sets (Nelson & Narens, 1994; Veenman, Van Hout-Wolters, & Afflerbach, 2006), and how to accurately measure metacognition (Pieschl, 2009; Schraw, Kuch, & Gutierrez, 2013). While researchers have gained understanding about the components of metacognition and the importance of this skill for academic and professional success, few have examined effective ways to teach metacognition to students (Brownlee, Purdie, & Boulton-Lewis, 2001).

Brownlee et al. (2001) examined the effectiveness of an experimental program designed to increase cognitive reflection and development of more advanced epistemological beliefs (i.e., beliefs about knowing). The experimental group received an intervention that encouraged students to consider their epistemological beliefs. This group was asked to relate their knowledge about thinking to their own process of thinking and reflect on this interaction in the form of journal entries. Students who were asked to reflect demonstrated increased advanced epistemological beliefs when compared to the control group.

In another study aimed at increasing metacognitive skill in college classrooms, Was, Beziat, and Isaacson (2013) had educational psychology students engage in monitoring practices (e.g., calibration) over the course of a semester. Specifically, Was and colleagues assessed students 13 times via short exams. Prior to each assessment, students were asked to predict their scores. After each exam, teaching assistants would discuss the students’ predictions and actual scores. Was et al. found that students’ monitoring improved over the course of the semester, in that they become better judges of their learning and performance as a result of the intervention.

Seeking to learn more about effective strategies for teaching metacognition, Richmond and Richmond (2012) compared active learning instruction to direct learning instruction of the topic of metacognitive theory. The active learning condition was characterized by group work and interaction with the instructor, and discussing effective learning strategies with one another to enhance awareness of best learning practices. In contrast, the direct learning condition was characterized by lecture presentation of metacognitive theory and rewriting information from PowerPoint slides presented. Richmond and Richmond (2012) found that active learning instruction increased higher level learning of metacognitive theory over that of students who received direct instruction.

As demonstrated by the above preliminary studies (e.g., Brownlee et al., 2001; Richmond & Richmond, 2012; Was et al., 2013), there are promising interventions but there is still a great need for more research on implementing effective instructional strategies to increase metacognitive skills in higher education courses. Specifically, What type of instruction is best suited for increasing metacognitive skills in the regular higher education classroom? Is metacognitive development best  accomplished through experience and reflection (e.g., Brownlee et al. 2001; Was et al., 2013),  or are there other effective instruction methods, such as Socratic or inquiry-based instruction? We believe that metacognitive instruction should be embedded into the content beginning at the start of the semester and continuing throughout the semester, similar to that of Was et al. (2013). However, more research is needed to see if this really is the most effective approach. Additionally, research should focus on higher and lower level learning and how these instructional strategies may differentially affect level of learning (e.g., Richmond & Richmond, 2012). Finally, instructional strategies should be designed so that students can transfer the metacognitive strategy across higher education courses.

Although the above suggestions for future research are not a comprehensive list, we believe that they represent an important start. As such, we are asking our fellow colleagues to spread the word and to begin conducting important research that seeks to answer these questions. The preliminary results invariably suggest that our students will greatly benefit from such endeavors as will the quality of faculty instruction.

References

Antonietti, A., Ignazi, S., & Perego, P. (2000). Metacognitive knowledge about problem-solving methods. British Journal of Educational Psychology, 70(1), 1-16. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/000709900157921

Metallidou, P. (2009). Pre-service and in-service teachers’ metacognitive knowledge about problem-solving strategies. Teaching and Teacher Education, 25(1), 76-82. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tate.2008.07.002

Nelson, T. O. & Narens, L. (1994). Why investigate metacognition. In J. Metcalf, & A. P. Shimamura (Eds), Metacogntiion, knowing about knowing (pp. 1-25). Cambridge: MIT.

Pieschl, S. (2009). Metacognition calibration—an extended conceptualization and potential applications. Metacognition Learning, 4, 3-31. doi: 10.1007/s11409-008-9030-4

Richmond, A. S. & Richmond, A. (2012, October). Teaching metacognition to preservice educators: A focus on transfer and retention. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Northern Rocky Mountain Educational Research Association, Park-City, UT.

Schraw, G., & Dennison, R. S. (1994). Assessing metacognitive awareness. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 19, 460-475.

Schraw, G., Kuch, F., & Gutierrez, A. P . (2013). Measure for measure: Calibrating ten commonly used calibration scores. Learning and Instruction, 24, 48-57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.learninstruc.2012.08.007

Topcu, A., & Ubuz, B. (2008). The effects of metacognitive knowledge on the pre-service teachers’ participation in the asynchronous online forum. Educational Technology & Society, 11(3), 1-12.

Veenman, M. J., Van Hout-Wolters, B. H. A. M., & Afflerbach, P. (2006). Metacognition and learning; Conceptual and methodological considerations. Metacognition and Learning, 1(1), 3-14. doi:10.1007/s11409-0066893-0.

Was, C. A., Beziat, T. L. R., & Isaacson, R. M. (2013). Improving metacognition in a college classroom: Does enough practice work? Journal of Research in Education 23(1). Retrieved from http://www.eeraonline.org/journal/files/v23/JRE_v23n1_Article_5_Was_et_al.pdf

by John Draeger, SUNY Buffalo State

As both a gym rat and an academic, I often think about the parallels between physical exercise and intellectual engagement. Both depend on individual ability and personal circumstances. Both can be done in variety of ways and for a variety of reasons. Both require consistent practice and good habits. Both require metacognitive awareness of particular strategies and the likelihood that they will lead to progress towards goals. And because the process is dynamic, we need to cultivate continued awareness of our strategies for physical and intellectual engagement.

Further, I submit that both physical exercise and intellectual engagement require cultivating a habit of constructive discomfort.  It isn’t easy to push our bodies and minds, but maintaining physical and intellectual growth requires it. Unlike the discomfort that comes from putting off an entire week’s worth of exercise until Saturday or waiting until the night before to begin writing a paper, the benefits of constructive discomfort are derived from consistently pushing ourselves in a way that facilitates progress towards our goals.

Related to this notion of constructive discomfort, Vygotsky (1978) argues that learning is most effective within the “zone of proximal development.” It is the space slightly beyond a learner’s current knowledge base and skill level, but a place where learning is still within a person’s reach. It is aspirational without being discouraging. It is challenging without setting someone up for failure.  In the case of exercise, my long-term goal might be to run a marathon. Given my perceived level of fitness, I should probably start with a “couch to 5k” and move up to a marathon later. It is possible that I am in better shape than I think and I can push myself beyond the 5k now. By consciously attending to my state of health and progress towards my long-term goals, I can make micro-adjustments that keep me in the zone of constructive discomfort and headed in the right direction. Instructors can make similar micro-adjustments in the classroom as they gauge the level of student ability. Again, metacognitive awareness of student understanding and progress towards well-articulated goals is essential to identifying the best strategies for a given group of students. Much like a “couch to 5k” program, assignment scaffolding in the classroom can maintain an appropriate level of constructive discomfort and guide students through the zone of proximal development (Wass, Harland, and Mercer, 2011). As students become more aware of their own learning processes, they can learn to make their own micro-adjustments. If, for example, they find themselves bored by some particular piece of classroom content, then they might ask themselves whether it is because they are not being challenged (much like  runners capable of doing more than a 5k) or because they are overwhelmed (much like runners who start out strong only to “over train” and lag behind their goals). As a scholar seated at my writing table, I often find myself asking these sorts of questions about my writing process and making micro-adjustments to keep me in the zone of constructive discomfort and heading towards my goals.

A person can be uncomfortable in a multitude of ways and there is little to be gained by discomfort for the sake of discomfort. If, however, constructive discomfort can contribute to physical and intellectual growth, then we should strive for it. Because knowing whether some particular instance of discomfort is constructive requires a metacognitive awareness of our individual circumstances and individual goals, we should cultivate a habit of metacognitive awareness for our learning, fitness, or any other skill we hope to develop.

References:

Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Mind and society: The development of higher mental processes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Wass, R., Harland, T., and Mercer, A. (2011). “Scaffolding critical thinking in the zone of Proximal development.” Higher Education Research and Development, 30 (3), 317-328.